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AN EMERGING RIGHT FOR MATURE MINORS
TO RECEIVE INFORMATION
Catherine J. Ross'
It is well recognized that "[clonstitutional rights do not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains
the state-defined age of majority."' That statement, fre-
quently quoted but inadequately explicated, points to a cen-
tral distinction between minors and adults. Each adult is
entitled to exercise the full panoply of constitutional rights,
regardless of his or her ability to understand or rationally ex-
ercise those rights.2  Children also possess constitutional lib-
erties, but each liberty asserted by a minor may ripen at dif-
ferent times and in different contexts.
Debate over the parameters of children's constitutional
rights remains contentious. For minors, compared to adults,
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1 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 52. 74 (1976).
2 Certain rights may be restricted for particular categories of adults such as pris-
oners. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401. 404 (1989) (holding that prison offi-
cials may restrict access to publications detrimental to institutional security).
3 Notwithstanding his thoughtful critique of the 'cult of rights.' Professor Lynn
Wardle has captured the essence of the imperative that children be included in the
group that may exercise rights:
mhe concept of rights... marks the minimum essential protections that all
persons owe to each other in our society. Children are humans, too .... If we
exclude any human beings from our system of rights. we violate one of the
fundamental principles on which our constitutional system of laws, and our
very society, is established ....
Lynn D. Wardle. The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: Tte Constitutional Rights of
Children, 27 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 321. 338 (1996); see also Katherine Hunt Federle.
Children, Curfews, and the Constitution, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1315. 1344-68 (1995)
[hereinafter Children, Curfews, and the Constitution) (arguing for empowerment of
children by recognizing substantive rights for minors that are as close as possible to
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any particular liberty is more likely to be limited in relation to
the minor's capacity and the societal interests involved.' Al-
though presumably, the level of constitutional protection of
minors' rights increases with maturation, the precise scope of
each right at different stages, prior to the age of majority, re-
mains ambiguous. In order to exercise the range of rights
that ripen as minors mature, young people need access to
ideas, protected under the First Amendment, that will inform
their increasing autonomy and understanding. In this arti-
cle, I propose a theory for an emerging claim under the
United States Constitution: minors have a right to receive
information in some circumstances, regardless of the limita-
tions imposed by their parents.5
Those who look upon the rights of children with skepti-
cism may wonder why young people cannot wait to obtain
controversial information until they reach the age of majority.
Such skeptics may also doubt that any contemporary teenag-
ers remain who have not been exposed to ideas of which their
parents disapprove. But consider the hypothetical situation
of a sixteen-year-old girl who knows she is dying of leukemia.
She may not live to reach the age of eighteen, and she wants
to make peace with her God. She is not sure, however, if her
God is the same as the God of her parents who belong to a
particularistic sect and have raised her in isolation from Ideas
in general circulation. In order to set her mind- and, argua-
bly her soul- at ease, she wants to learn about a variety of
spiritual and religious views so that she can embrace the be-
lief system that she truly believes in. She needs information,
and she needs it right away.
The argument that teenagers have a right to knowledge
despite their parents' objections draws from three strands of
existing jurisprudence. First, it relies on the line of First
Amendment theory that the right to speech includes an inte-
those afforded adults); Katherine Hunt Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights
for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 983
(1993) (arguing that "capacity" should not affect the availability of rights). Compare,
e.g., Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspec-
tives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 30-34 (1994) (arguing that because the "lib-
eral jurisprudential framework" that promotes rights for children is largely Irrelevant
to the day-to-day lives of young people the law should listen to the unique perspec-
tives of children).
4 See infra Part I.B.
5I have argued elsewhere that children may have cognizable civil claims even
where their preferences conflict with those of their parents. See generally Catherine
J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counsel for Children In Civil Litlga-
tion, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1571 (1996) [hereinafter From Vulnerability to Voice] (setting
forth an analytical model for appointment of counsel for minors in certain civil mat-
ters and reserving exploration of the precise subject matter of such civil claims).
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gral right to receive information so that speakers can evaluate
and choose among the ideas which they prefer to voice.6 Sec-
ond, it builds on the doctrine that children possess constitu-
tional rights, including rights under the First Amendment.7
Third, the argument draws on precedents that recognize that
mature minors8 possess certain liberty interests independent
of their parents.
The thesis of this article is that minors possess autono-
mous liberty interests that cannot be exercised meaningfully
without access to information conveying a variety of view-
points. All too often, discussion about constitutional rights
and children has focused on the complex relationship be-
tween the state and the family as a whole, minimizing the
potential divisions within the family unit.' Thus, a child and
her parents may agree that neither wants the child to receive
certain information from the state. The legal question is then
framed as whether or not the state will accommodate that
unified request by, for example, exempting the child from
curricular requirements. In some instances, the state may
deny accommodation because it has something important to
communicate to all minors. In a second set of circumstances,
parents and children may make a unified claim for the chil-
dren to exercise speech rights that the state does not wish to
grant. The posture in which the constitutional claims of par-
ents and their children are uniformly aligned is, however,
only one of a variety of plausible permutations.
6 See infra Part IA.
7 See nfra Part I.B.
8 The legal concept of a "mature minor' is discussed infra Part I. See Belotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642-44 (1979) (plurality opinion) (protecting the right of mature
minors to bypass a law requiring parental consent before undergoing an abortion).
9 See infra Part I.C. Throughout this article. I use the term 'parents' to include
all individuals entrusted with the primary care of children. "Entrusted' is a carefully
chosen term. I agree with other scholars who have observed that children are indeed
different in many essential ways from adults. Children have "needs" in addition to
needing rights. Children need positive relationships with nurturing adults. The
well-being of infants in particular depend on the formation of such relationships. As
they mature, children's lives are still largely defined by relationships as much as
they are by autonomy. See MARrHA MINOW. MAKING ALL THE DIFFERMENCE: INCLUSION.
EXCLUSION, AN AMERICAN LAW 306 (1990): Barbara Bennett Woodhouse. Hatching the
Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parent's Rights. 14 CARDOZO L REv. 1747. 1842
(1993).
'0 See, e.g., Lesley E. Daigle, Empowering Women to Protect: Improvlng Intervention
with Victims of Domestic Violence In Cases of Child Abuse and Neglect: A Study of
Travis County, Texas, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 287. 305-07 (1998) (discussing the
state's power to intervene in parent-child relationships): Katherine C. Pearson. Coop-
erate or We'll Take Your Child: The Parents' Fictional Voluntary Separation Decision
and a Proposal for Change. 65 TENN. L. REv. 835, 843 n.44 (1998) (discussing
whether state removal of children suspected of being abused violates parents' con-
stitutional rights).
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The situations in which the constitutional interests and
claims of minors may differ from those of their parents have
received much less scrutiny. When such differences arise, of
course, the minor cannot formally assert any constitutional
rights against parents. A child can only assert a claim to a
constitutional right to receive information against the state.
This article considers the set of circumstances that arise
when a mature minor wants information that the state gener-
ally makes available, but the minor's parents object. No re-
ported cases arise in this posture. The state- acting through
such institutions as public schools and libraries- possesses
what appear to be three choices in such a dispute. First, the
state can expressly accommodate the parent's decision to
deny the minor access to information. Second, the state can
adopt a "neutral" stance, which would amount to accommo-
dating parental preferences. Third, the state can recognize
that the minor has a protected constitutional right to receive
information under the Speech Clause" and make such infor-
mation accessible to the minor on the same basis that it Is
available to others. I argue that, under certain limited cir-
cumstances, common presumptions should shift with the re-
sult that the third option (allowing minors access to informa-
tion) would become the presumptive norm.
Part I of this article considers three jurisprudential build-
ing blocks that support a mature minor's right to receive in-
formation: (i) the role of the right to receive information
within the framework of the Speech Clause; (ii) the general
scope of the speech rights of minors pertinent to this discus-
sion; and (iii) the existing constitutional vision of the matura-
tion process and its relationship to emerging autonomy
rights. Part II applies the mature minor's right to information
in the context of other constitutionally recognized liberty in-
terests including abortion, sexuality and contraception, and
freedom of religious expression. Part III concludes with a
brief discussion of the method by which the right to receive
information might protect minors from gender discrimination.
I ICongress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
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I. THREE CORNERSTONES OF A MATURE MINOR'S RIGHT
TO RECEIVE INFORMATION
A. 7he First Amendment Right to Receive Information
The Constitution protects the right to receive information
and ideas." The right to receive information is the logical
corollary of the right to speak. 3  This reasoning proceeds
from Justice Holmes' classic dissent in Abrams, the first ex-
press judicial enunciation that the First Amendment pro-
motes the marketplace of ideas." After all, what good is a
marketplace that has only sellers but no buyers, whether of
widgets or ideas?'5 The right to receive information is also es-
sential to the realization of liberty interests that emphasize
individual self-realization and autonomy. Both the market-
place of ideas and the liberty model of the First Amendment
are inseparable from the goal of democratic self-governance
expressed through the Speech Clause.
The right to receive information was the express basis of
the holding in Stanley v. Georgia 16 In Stanley, the Supreme
Court overturned a statute criminalizing "mere private pos-
session" of legally obscene material for personal use.'7 The
appellant, who had been convicted under the statute after the
police found three obscene movies in his bedroom, argued,
12 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557. 564 (1969) (Marshall. J.) ('It is now well
established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and
ideas.") (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers. 319 U.S. 141. 143 (1943)).
13 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15. 44 (1973) (Douglas. J.. dissenting) (noting
that "the right to know is the corollary of the right to speak"): Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the right of the public to receive suitable access
to social, political, esthetic, moral and other Ideas..." to 'preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.-): In re Syracuse Peace
Council, 2 F.C.C.R_ 5043, 5057 (1987) (stating that the First Amendment gives the
people the right to receive ideas that are "unfettered by government Interference-).
SeeAbrams v. United States. 250 U.S. 616. 630 (1919) (Holmes. J.. dissenting)
(iMhe best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the markeL).
is See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301. 308 (1965) (Brennan. J.. concur-
ring) ("It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buy-
ers.").
16 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
17 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 559, 568. Material that meets the legal definition of ob-
scenity is not protected under the First Amendment. See Roth v. United States. 354
U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that "obscenity is not within the area of constitution-
ally protected speech"); see also Sable Communications of California v. FCC. 492
U.S. 115, 124 (1989) ("We have repeatedly held that the protection of the First
Amendment does not extend to obscene speech."): Miller v. California. 413 U.S. 15.
23-24 (1973) (reaffirming that obscene material is not protected by the First
Amendment).
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among other things, that he possessed "the right to read...
what he pleases." 8 The Court agreed.'9 Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Marshall limited the question to whether "mere
private possession of obscene material" could be made a
crime, and concluded that it could not, based on the primacy
of an individual's "fundamental" right "to read or observe
what he pleases."" 'This right to receive information and
ideas," the majority emphasized, "is fundamental to our free
society.21
The reasoning of the Supreme Court in a variety of other
cases involving the Speech Clause also implicates the right to
receive information; a majority of the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized this right in substantive obiter dicta more than once.2
" Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
19 Six Justices signed the majority opinion. The remaining three did not take ex-
ception to Justice Marshall's analysis of the individual's right to receive ideas. See
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568-69 (Black, J., concurring) (asserting that the protections of
the Speech Clause are absolute); id. at 569-72 (Stewart, J., concurring) (arguing that
the Court should not have reached the question raised under the First Amendment
because the movies were seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and therefore
should not have been admitted at trial).
20 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568. The constitutional legitimacy of excepting obscene
matter from the protection of the Speech Clause rests, Justice Marshall explained,
on the dangers posed by distribution of such materials, such as the risk that they
might reach children or "intrude upon" public sensibilities. Id. at 567. Where the
adult recipient chooses the material, however, "no such dangers" exist to support
governmental intrusion into the privacy of an "individual's mind" and home. Id. The
argument in this article Is confined to the right of minors to receive protected speech,
that is, speech that Is not legally obscene. For criticisms of the exclusion of "ob-
scene" speech from the protection of the Speech Clause, see Paris Adult Theater I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 98-114 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the difficul-
ties of separating obscene speech from other sexually oriented artistic speech);
NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR
WOMEN'S RIGHTS 56-59 (1995) (discussing how censorship of speech labeled obscene
may intrude on political expression); Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More Comes Into Focus
When You Remove the Lens Cap: Why Proliferating New Communications Technolo-
gies Make it Particularly Urgent for the Supreme Court To Abandon its Inside-Out Ap-
proach To Freedom of Speech and Bring Obscenity, Fighting Words and Group Libel
Within the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REv. 883, 902-05 (1996) (exploring the con-
tradictions between Roth and Stanley).
2 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564 (holding that the right to receive ideas applies "re-
gardless of their social worth").
22 The right to receive information was a major element in the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Reno v. ACLU, in which the Court overturned the regulation of "Inde-
cent" Internet communication that did not meet the legal definition of obscenity. See
521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997). In order to protect minors, Justice Stevens wrote for the
Court, the statute suppressed speech "that adults have a constitutional right to re-
ceive." Id, see also, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783
(1978) (asserting that the role of the First Amendment includes protecting "the dlis-
semination of information and ideas); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63
(1972) (Blackmun, J.) (noting that "[iln a variety of contexts this Court has referred
to a First Amendment right to 'receive information and ideas'") (quoting Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment protects the right of the public to re-
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In its 1965 decision in Lamont v. Postmaster General, for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court overturned a postal regulation
that required the addressees of foreign communist propa-
ganda (in this instance, the Peking Review) to respond to no-
tification from the post office indicating that they in fact
wanted the mal delivered.23 The majority opinion, authored
by Justice Douglas, rested on what he called the "narrow
ground" that the government may not impose an "affirmative
obligation" on the recipient as a condition of receiving mail."
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion made explicit the
premise left unarticulated by the majority: the First Amend-
ment embraces the right to receive communications as well
as to speak.'
The concept of the right to receive information captured
the approval of every Justice who participated in the Supreme
Court's consideration of Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp.2 even though the concept was not expressly before the
Court in that case. This right sounds an implicit theme both
in the majority opinion and in then-Associate Justice
Rehnquist's concurrence. The precise question before the
Court in Bolger involved the right of a contraceptive manu-
facturer to mail to the public unsolicited pamphlets described
as "informational" which concerned the availability of pro-
phylactics generally and the prevention of sexually transmit-
ted diseases.28 The Court upheld the rights of the commercial
speaker, holding that the importance of conveying "truthful
ceive a variety of viewpoints and information): Lamont v. Postmaster Gen.. 381 U.S.
301 (1965) (invalidating restrictions on mall delivery of "communist propaganda):
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516. 534 (1945) (holding that laborers have a right to
hear what union organizers wish to communicate); Cf Butler v. MichIgan. 352 U.S.
380, 383 (1957) (not expressly discussing the right to receive information, but hold-
ing that the state cannot reduce the adult population to "reading only what is fit for
children").
381 U.S. 301 (1965).
Id. at 307 (Douglas, J.). The Speech Clause does leave listeners free to decline
information. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't. 397 U.S. 728. 736-37
(1970) (upholding a statute which permits addressees to give notice that they do not
wish to receive additional sexually explicit mailings).
Lamont, 381 U.S. at 308-09 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Martin v. Struth-
ers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)) (holding that the right to distribute literature "neces-
sar(ly protects the right to receive It).
463 U.S. 60 (1983).
Id. at 69 (Marshall. J.. joined by Burger, C.J.. and White. Blackmun. Pmvell.
JJ.); id. at 76 (Relnquist, J.. concurring, joined by O'Connor. J.). Justice Brennan
did not participate in Bolger, but would most likely have pursued the line of reason-
ing he began in Lamont and later continued in Island Trees. See Board of Educ.. Is-
land Trees Union Free Sch. Dist No. 26 v. Pico. 457 U.S. 853 (1982): Lamont. 381
U.S. at 308: see also supra notes 15 and 71 and accompanying text referring to La-
mont and Island Trees. respectively.
2 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67 n.13.
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information relevant to important social issues" outweighed
the government's asserted interests.2 9 Justice Marshall's
opinion for the Court examined the importance of the right of
parents to receive information that might help them in car-
rying out some of their most difficult responsibilities, con-
cluding that the statute prohibiting the unsolicited mailing of
contraception advertisements was defective in part because it
denied parents access to important information and in part
because it denied teenagers access to critical knowledge.
Similarly, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist's concurrence,
joined by Justice O'Connor, emphasized that although par-
ents might be entitled to the government's support in limiting
the kinds of materials that reached the family mailbox, as the
government had argued in the case, the statute at issue In-
hibited the interests of parents because the law denied "par-
ents access to information about birth control that might help
them make informed decisions" about what to tell their chil-
dren.3' Seven of the eight Justices who participated in the
Bolger decision thus recognized a right to receive at least
some types of information. The two remaining Justices on
the Supreme Court at the time Bolger was decided- Justices
Brennan and Stevens- have advocated a right to receive in-
formation elsewhere."
Despite its importance, the right to receive information
remains a relatively unexplored aspect of freedom of speech
even when adults assert such a claim.m A handful of Justices
29 Id. at 69 (stating that "the First Amendment interest served by such speech [Is]
paramount").
30 Id. at 74-75 n.30 (noting that "the statute also quite clearly denies information
to minors, who are entitled to 'a significant measure of First Amendment protection'")
(citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975)).
31 Bolger, 463 U.S. 60, 79 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
32 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30 (1978) (Stevens, J.. dissenting)
(noting "the First Amendment protects not only the dissemination but also the re-
ceipt of information and ideas") (citing Island Trees, 457 U.S. at 867-68 n.20 (Bren-
nan, J., plurality opinion, joined by Stevens, J.)).
W Professor Barron observed in 1973 that the primacy of the listener Is "a pio-
neering concept which is not yet fully developed or understood." JEROME A. BARRON,
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO MASS MEDIA 145 (1973).
With the exception of what Professor Thomas Emerson labeled a preliminary explo-
ration of an emerging right, the right to receive information has not been the focus of
much scholarly attention in the intervening years. See generally Thomas Emerson.
Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1976). The right to
receive information is discussed in William E. Lee, The Supreme Court and the Right
to Receive Expression, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 303 (arguing that the right to receive rests
largely on the significance of the speaker's right to speak) and briefly in Note, Content
Regulation and the Dimensions of Free Expression, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1854, 1863-64 &
nn.52-57 (1983). The phrase does not appear in the title of any other article pub-
lished in a major law review revealed by electronic search, nor is it deemed suffi-
ciently important to appear in the indexes to the many Important books on freedom
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have clarified the significance of the right to receive informa-
tion in separate opinions.3 Lower courts have confirmed the
centrality of the right to receive information within the
structure of the First Amendment.m The subtextual status of
the right to receive information may be attributable in part to
the fact that it is frequently taken for granted and subsumed
within the speaker's right to express his or her views. Nor-
mally, speakers pursue their own speech rights in court, and
potential listeners do not become parties. Speakers who
know what message they wish to deliver may well be more
motivated to seek vindication of their rights than potential
listeners, who may not know what message they are going to
of speech. Significant exceptions resting on the concept of the right to receive infor-
mation- although not that exact phrase- include OWEN M. FISS. LIBERAUS!,s
DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER 13-30 (1996) (ar-
guing that when courts scrutinize regulations of speech, they should focus on
whether the regulation at issue enriches or impoverishes the universe of speech):
MARTiN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRIrICAL ANALYSIS 47 (1984) (stating
that if self-realization is accorded central status within the Speech Clause. then -the
individual needs an uninhibited flow of information and opinion to aid him or her in
making life-affecting decisions, in governing his or her own life).
34 See, e.g., Board of Educ.. Island Trees Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico. 457 U.S.
853 (1982) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 57-66); Houchtns. 438 U.S.
at 30 (Stevens, J., dissenting): FCC v. Pacifica Found.. 438 U.S 726. 764 (1978)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's decision to allow a ban on inde-
cent radio speech in this instance Ignores the "constitutionally protected interests
of... those who desire to receive [such] broadcasts'); Miller v. California. 413 U.S.
15, 44 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (asserting. 'the right to know Is the corollary
of the right to speak or publish); Klelndienst v. Mandel. 408 U.S. 753. 775 (1972)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (holding that by barring a foreign speaker on the basis of
his ideas, the government prevents U.S. citizens from exercising fundamental First
Amendment rights because "it)he freedom to speak and the freedom to hear are In-
separable; they are two sides of the same coin"); Ginsberg v. New York. 390 U.S. 629.
649 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (arguing that freedom of expression, the 'free
trade in ideas." involves not only the right to speak and publish but also the 'liberty
of each man to decide for himself what he will read and to what he wll listen-) (citing
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616. 630 (1919) (Holmes. J.. dissenting)).
35 Lower courts have also indicated the centrality of the right to receive Ideas to
the framework of the Speech Clause. See Kreimer v. Bureau of Police. 958 F.2d
1242, 1251 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that a right to receive information applies to pub-
lic libraries); Fox v. Board of Trustees, 841 F.2d 1207. 1211-12 (2d Cir. 1988) (ap-
plying the right to receive information to college students) overruled on other grounds.
492 U.S. 469 (1989); Mainstream Loudon v. Board of Trustees. 2 F. Supp. 2d 783.
792 (E.D. Va- 1998) (affirming that 'the right to receive information is inherent in the
right to speak) (internal citations omitted); Mainstream Loudon v. Board of Trustees
of the Loudon County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998) (granting sum-
mary judgment to plaintiffs in the same case); Sheck v. Baileyville Sch. Comm.. 530
F. Supp. 679, 685 (D. Me. 1982) (stating that book bans Impermissibly restrict the
"right to receive information and ideas, the indispensable reciprocal of any meaningful
right ofexpresson) (citing Procunier v. Martinez. 416 U.S. 396. 408 (1974)): ACLUof
Va. v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893, 896 (W.D. Va. 1970) (reasoning that the
right to speak would have limited meaning if no one had the right to hear): Smith v.
University ofTenn., 300 F. Supp. 777, 780 (E.D. Tenn. 1969) (stating that the right of
"free speech extends to listeners").
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hear or how much they will value that message.
Where the rights of the speakers themselves are pure and
undiminished, it is generally unnecessary for those who op-
pose regulation of speech to rest their arguments on the right
to receive information.36 Instead, the notion of a right to hear
is more often invoked where courts have, in the past, limited
speakers' rights under the Speech Clause. Such cases in-
volve, for example, commercial speakers," including the mass
media,' whose ideas are deemed to have limited social
worth,39 or foreigners whose speech originates outside the
United States. 40 The right to receive information may also be
invoked in the service of unpopular claimants, as in the case
of prisoners or the homeless."
Minors are similarly disfavored in their quests to exercise
constitutional rights. Where minors are concerned, the right
Although the press occupies a position of primacy under the Speech Clause. in
accordance with James Madison's insistence that only a well-informed public can
sustain free debate and full democracy, the press's right of access to events rests in
part on its role as agent of the public. Through its role as agent, the press serves as
an instrument by which individuals exercise their right to receive information. See
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
37 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (applying the test
for commercial speech); but see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (holding that commercial speech is not
entirely without First Amendment protection); Fox, 841 F.2d at 1211-12 (upholding
the right of university students to receive commercial speech); Martin Redish, First
Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial Speech Distinction: The Case of
the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553, 553 (1997) (arguing against the dis-
tinction between non-commercial speech and truthful commercial speech on the
grounds that both expand the marketplace of ideas).
See generally FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (finding that
"[oif all forms of communication, broadcasting has the most limited First Amendment
protection"); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating that "it is
the right of viewers and listeners, not the right of broadcasters, which is paramount"
because of the unique attributes of broadcast communication); Action for Children's
Television v. FCC. 58 F.3d 654, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (asserting that broadcast media
may be subject to more restrictive regulation than other types of media under the
First Amendment); BARRON, supra note 33, at 319-343 (advocating greater public ac-
cess to media); FISS, supra note 33, at 17-46 (critiquing various liberal responses to
free speech controversies).
39 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (holding that the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 was not narrowly tailored to achieve its expressed purpose of
protecting the young from undefined, potentially harmful speech); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 558-564 (1969) (affirming the right to possess materials containing
obscene speech in one's home).
40 See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (striking down on consti-
tutional grounds a statute aimed only at speech labeled as foreign propaganda).
41 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 398 (1974) (invalidating censorship of
prison inmates' mail); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1255 (3d Cir.
1992) (upholding a homeless man's right of access to the town public library on the
ground that the First Amendment includes a "positive right of public access to In-
formation," including access to "a public library, the quintessential locus of the re-
ceipt of information").
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to speak and to receive information is widely perceived as
being more limited than the corresponding rights of adults, as
discussed in Part I.B 42 Where young persons assert rights to
speech, and make related autonomy claims, the traditional
limitations on the core rights of the young move the right to
receive information to a central doctrinal position.4
B. The Scope of the Rights of Minors under the Speech Clause
Briefly Considered
The Supreme Court has accepted without question the
notion that the state has a greater interest and therefore
broader authority, in regulating the access of minors to cer-
tain speech than with regard to adults.' The Supreme Court,
however, has rejected state action that would make material
entirely unavailable to minors regardless of the minors' own
parents' preferences for openness." The notion that parents
may elect to make controversial materials available to their
42 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l. 431 U.S. 678. 692 (1977) (asserting that the
state's power to regulate children is greater than its power to regulate adults): Id. at
705 (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that the -States have broad latitude to regulate
with respect to adolescents") (citing Prince v. Massachusetts. 321 U.S. 158 (1944)):
Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville. 422 U.S. 205. 214 n. 11(1975) (stating that the
speech rights of minors are not co-extensive with those of adults, in part because
minors lack full capacity for individual choice); Ginsberg v. New York. 390 U.S. 629
(1968) (holding that the state may use a 'variable" concept of obscenity to shelter
children from speech that would be constitutionally protected for adults).
4 Many of the cases cited in supra notes 35 and 37 on the importance of the right
to receive information involve claims by students, both under and over the age of
majority. E.g., Fox v. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York. 841 F.2d
1207 (2d Cir. 1988) (university); Sheck v. Balleyville Sch. Comm.. 530 F. Supp. 2d
679 (D. Me. 1982) (high school); ACLU of Va. v. Radford College. 315 F. Supp. 893
(W.D. Va. 1970) (university); Smith v. University of Tenn.. 300 F. Supp. 777 (E.D.
Tenn. 1969) (university). The Supreme Court of New Jersey found that a market-
place of ideas is central to the educational mission which 'seeks to encourage both a
wide and continuous exchange of opinions and ideas and to foster a policy of open-
ness .... ." New Jersey v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615. 631 (N.J. 1980).
In a forthcoming article, I challenge the notion that the State has demonstrated
a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the regulation of non-obscene, protected
but controversial speech. See Catherine J. Ross. Anything Goes: Examining the
State's Interest in Protecting Children from Controverslal Speech. 53 VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2000).
44 Commentators have challenged the assumption that children's substantive
rights should not be co-extensive with the rights enjoyed by adults. See. e.g.. Kath-
erine Hunt Federle, Children, Curfews, and the Constitution. supra note 3. at 1340-
68. Elsewhere. Professor Federle argues that power should be shifted to children.
See Katherine Hunt Federle, Rights Flow Downhill 2 INT'L J. CHILDRE.'S RTS.. 343.
363-68 (1994).
45 See Denver Area Educ. Tele-Communications Consortium. Inc. v. FCC. 518
U.S. 727 (1996) (overturning a ban on indecent broadcasts): Sable Communications
of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (overturning a complete ban on "dial-a-
porn" communications).
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children when the state restricts direct access by minors has
been a foundation of judicial reasoning in cases upholding
state regulation of speech for the purpose of protecting chil-
dren.46 In Ginsberg v. New York, for example, the Supreme
Court underscored that state regulation barring sale of so-
called "girlie magazines" to minors did not have the effect of
making the materials completely unavailable to minors.4 ' To
the contrary, parents remained free under the statute to buy
"girlie magazines" for their children.4 It is not, however, al-
ways practicable for parents to provide direct access to mate-
rials, even where the parents support the young person's ef-
forts to obtain information.49 Increasingly, the regulated
materials may be far more expensive than a "girlie maga-
zine,"s' which may make the communication inaccessible for
all practical purposes.
Schools and public libraries, for example, frequently refuse
to allow young people unrestricted access to the Internet,
and, in many instances, limit what adults, including parents,
can see as well. Such policies violate the American Library
Association Code of Ethics as well as the constitutional right
to receive infornation.5' Understanding that "[eithical dilem-
46 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (holding that a state may
limit the sale of adult magazines so long as those restrictions do not make the mate-
rials completely inaccessible).
47 Id. (stating that parents have obligations to educate their children, and that the
State can "neither supply nor hinder" those obligations).
48 Id. (noting that the statute "recognizes the parental role in assessing sex-related
materials").
49 Readers of this journal are likely to take access to libraries and other resources
as a given. But many individuals and families lack access to traditional materials
such as books and magazines because no public library Is available to them. John
T. McQuiston, In Search of Free Library Access for AlL: Panel Is on the Road, Asking
Residents About Improving Services, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1999, at B5 (noting that
over one million residents of New York State lack free library privileges, and the ma-
jority of the elementary schools in the state have neither a "complete library" nor a
librarian).
50 The costs of Internet access, for example, include the cost of a computer or op-
erating unit, a telephone line, and, in most instances, a monthly access charge. A
recent government study shows a widening gap between rich and poor In Internet
access. Children in single parent households and persons of color are much less
likely than members of other groups to have access to computers and the Internet.
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMEM" OF
COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH THE NET: DEFINING THE DIGITAL DMDE (July 1999).
s, Such policies would also violate the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child, if the United States subscribed to It. See Convention on the Rights of the
Child, G.A. Res. 25 (XLIV), U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/25
(1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989) [hereinafter U.N. Convention]. Every nation
except for the United States and Somalia has ratified the U.N. Convention. See
Cynthia Price Cohen & Susan Kilbourne, Jurisprudence of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child: A Guide for Research and Analysis, 19 MICH. J. lINT'L L. 633, 635
(1998). The U.N. Convention provides that each child shall have the "right to free-
dom of expression," including the "freedom to seek [and] receive ... information and
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mas occur when values are in conflict," professional librari-
ans are "explicitly committed to intellectual freedom and the
freedom of access to information."52 They specifically note the
"special obligation" of libraries to "ensure the free flow of in-
formation and ideas to... future generations [i.e.. chil-
dren] ."53
High-minded principles are not always able to withstand
public pressures. In Austin, Texas, for example, a state
capital and university community, a controversy erupted in
1997 over the use of Internet filters in the public library.s' A
compromise was reached in which the library agreed to filter
most of its computers for sex and nudity, but to provide four
unfiltered computers for use only by adult patrons. Minors
in Austin may not use the unfiltered computers, even if they
have permission slips from their parents or if their parents
accompany them.5m This restriction is particularly significant
since forty-five percent of Internet users depend on libraries
for Internet access. 54 Even if every resident of the United
States had Internet access at home, the premises of minors'
rights to receive information make it imperative that libraries
offering Internet services allow minors access to all legally
available materials.5
Imagine that a parent wants to use the Internet to help
teach a teen about safe sex. The Austin library would require
the parent to do the research alone and share it with the teen
later, thus possibly leaving responsive questions unex-
plored.m To be sure, the state has no affirmative obligation to
ideas of all kinds.., through any media of the child's choice." U.N. Convention. su-
pro., at Art. 13.1. 1.M. According to its proponents. the U.N. Convention contemplates
a right to information "broader than children's speech rights [as presently] defined by
the U.S. Supreme Court" Susan Kilbourne. Opposition to U.S. Ratylcatlon of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Responses to Parental Rights
Arguments, 4 LOY. POVERTY L.J. 55. 77 (1998).
American Library Association, Code of Ethics (adopted June 28. 1995)
<http://www.ala.org/alaorg/oif/ethcs> (pledging to promote -equitable access," re-
sist censorship, and protect user privacy).
w Id. (elaborating on the pledge to promote -equitable access." resist censorship.
and protect privacy of users).
54 Katie Hafher, Library Grapples With Internet Freedom. N.Y. ThIES. Oct. 15.
1998, at G1 (detailing the conflict over Internet filters in the Austin. Texas public li-
braxy).
Wral (describing the requirements for the use of unfiltered computers).
56 ACLU, Censorship in a Box: Why Blocking SofIware Is Wrong for Public Libraries.
(visited Jan. 22, 1999) <http//www.aclu.org/ssues/cyber/bo.Nhtml> (citing a Niel-
sen survey showing that 45% of Internet users rely on libraries for access).
57 Pornography, like all material that meets the legal definition of obscenity. is
outside the protection of the First Amendment and is subject to criminal regulation.
as are communications from pedophiles intended to lure children to become victims
of abuse. See Reno v. ACLU. 521 U.S. 844, 877 n.44 (1997).
58 The fundamental rights of parents, discussed supra notes 46-48 and accompa-
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make information available, 9 but where it does it must not
engage in content or viewpoint discrimination as it does In
the Austin public library.6°
Children possess rights under the Speech Clause."1 When
Justice Fortas stated in Tinker v. Des Moines School District
that children do not "shed their [First Amendment rights] at
the schoolhouse gate," the majority made clear by implication
that those same children possess First Amendment rights
outside the school setting.62 The Court has declined to tackle
the broader question of how to define the scope of children's
First Amendment rights inside or outside of the schools. In
the area of speech, as in other areas implicating constitu-
tional rights, the Supreme Court has been "reluctant to at-
tempt to define 'the totality of the relationship of the juvenile
and the state.'"6 Sidestepping the issue, the Justices have
concluded that the question of the extent of the state's "power
to regulate conduct of minors not constitutionally regulable
when committed by adults is a vexing one, perhaps not sus-
ceptible of precise answer."' Even within the school, how-
ever, where the state has broad powers over minors,' Tinker
nying text, protect a parent's decision to provide a teenager with information about
sex, even if the rest of the community protests that such information Is inappropri-
ate for a person of that age. See id. at 878.
59 See Board of Educ., Island Trees, Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 888 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("'[tihe right to receive information and
ideas' ... does not carry ... the concomitant right to have those Ideas affirmatively
provided at a particular place by the government") (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 577, 564 (1969)); cf. Fiss, supra note 33, 19-20 (arguing that the state has an
affirmative obligation to enhance speech).
60 See Mainstream Loudon v. Board of Trustees, 24 F. Supp. 2d 522, 570 (E.D.
Va. 1998) (holding that if a public library offers Internet access, any restriction based
on content must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest); Po-
lice Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (holding that the government
may not single out one subject or viewpoint for regulation in a public place); Milwau-
kee Soc. Democratic Publ'g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the government does not have to run a post office, but as
long as it does so the constraints of the First Amendment apply).
See Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-214 (1975) (citing
Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)) (asserting that "minors are en-
titled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection").
393 U.S. 503 (1969) (affirming that students have the right to exercise non-
disruptive political speech at school by wearing black armbands to protest the war in
Vietnam).
W Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (Brennan, J., plurality opin-
ion) (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967)).
64 Id. (discussing the State's power to regulate the conduct of minors).
65 See Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-57 (1995) (asserting
that the rights of students are limited because they are in the custodial care of the
school); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (reaffirming
that the speech rights of students must be considered "'in light of the special char-
acteristics of the school environment'") (citation omitted); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (emphasizing school authority to Impose civility).
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underscored that "students may not be regarded as closed-
circuit recipients of only that which the [s]tate chooses to
communicate."' This much should have been clear since the
Supreme Court explained so eloquently in West Virginia
Board of Education v. Bamette that the role of schools in
"educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we
are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach
youth to discount important principles of our government as
mere platitudes."6
The pivotal role of the right to receive information when
evaluating presumptively truncated rights of minors was clear
in the flurry of opinions issued in Board of Education, Island
Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Picofsc Writing for a
plurality of four, Justice Brennan expressly applied the right
to receive information to minors.6 His opinion is frequently
cited to stand for the proposition that authorities do not have
unfettered discretion to remove books from school libraries."
Justice Brennan relied heavily on the Supreme Court's
long history of holdings that the right to receive information
' Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (stating that the state cannot monopolize the flo of
information to students).
67 West Virginia State Bd. of Edue. v. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624. 637 (1943).
68 Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. PIco. 457 U.S. 853
(1982). The Justices Issued seven separate opinions. Id.
9 Id. at 867, 872.
70 See, e.g., Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dst.. 158 F.3d 1022. 1027 n.5
(9th Cir. 1998) (stating that Island Trees -held that a school board could not remove
books from a school library' if its motives were suspect without violating students'
right to receive information); Mainstream Loudon v. Board of Trustees. 2 F. Supp. 2d
783, 792-94 (E.D. Va. 1998) (the Island Trees plurality opinion stands for the propo-
sition that school boards cannot remove library books Just because they disagree
with them, but could do so based on a concept such as 'educational sutability"):
Virgil v. School Bd. of Colum. County. 677 F. Supp. 1547. 1550 (M.D. Fla. 1988)
(stating that Island Trees held that removal of books from the school library violated
the students' right to receive information): see also. e.g.. Stanley ngber. Sociallza-
tion, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of Orthodoxy': Value Training In the Public Schools.
1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15. 52-78 (1987) (discussing Island Tree's relevance in limiting
the authority of schools to inculcate community values in minors); Glenn Kubota.
Comment, Public School Usage of Internet Filtering Software: Book Banning Reincar-
nated?, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. J. 687, 707-10 (1997) (arguing that while only a plurality
in Island Trees emphasized the student's right to receive information, the 'holding
found ad hoc removal of books from a school library on the basis of the ideas con-
tained therein unconstitutional).
Notwithstanding the use that both scholars and lower courts have made of Is-
land Trees, I recognize that the holding is limited to a remand for development of the
facts because summary judgment was granted erroneously. See Island Trees. 457
U.S. at 883-84 (White, J.. concurring) (arguing that a material issue of fact precluded
summary judgment below); Mainstream Loudon, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 792 (stating that in
Island Trees, a sharply divided court remanded for a factual determination of the
school board's motives).
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"is an inherent corollary of the rights of free speech."'" The
right, he explained, "follows ineluctably from the sender's
First Amendment right to send" ideas. 2
The right has a second source as well. It stems directly
from the liberty claims of the listeners. "[The right to receive
ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful
exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political free-
dom."73 Without reservation, the plurality applied the right of
minors to receive ideas as represented by the students who
had challenged the book removals.74 The plurality maintained
that allowing access to ideas in a school library was an im-
portant aspect of preparing students "for active and effective
participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society in
which they will soon be adult members."75  Justice Brennan
relied on a line of precedents beginning with Bamette for the
principle that, although schools have a duty to inculcate val-
ues, they may not impose orthodoxy in matters of opinion.76
The Supreme Court remanded the Island Trees case for a
hearing into the school board's motives for denying students
access to books that a citizens' group argued were "anti-
71 Island Trees, 457 U.S. at 867 (stating the basis for minors' rights to receive in-
formation).
Id. (emphasis in original) (describing the constitutional basis for the right to re-
ceive information).73 Id.
74 Id. at 868 (noting "students too are beneficiaries of this principle"). Justice
Blackmun, who joined in the plurality opinion, did not participate in Part II.A.I.
which discussed the right to receive information. See id. at 878-79 (Blackmun. J..
concurring) (arguing that the state may not "discriminat[e] between ideas" because
school officials disapprove of the Idea for political reasons). Other judicial opinions
in the case did not disagree with the notion that the Constitution includes a right to
receive ideas, or that such a right might apply to minors in certain circumstances,
but differed with the manner in which the plurality applied these theories. See Id. at
887 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (acknowledging a right to receive ideas but denying
what he viewed as the plurality's assertion that the right imposes an affirmative obli-
gation on the school board to make ideas available). Earlier Supreme Court deci-
sions also expressly contemplate that the right to receive information applies to mi-
nors, noting that the right to receive information Is "nowhere more vital" than In
schools. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 763 (1972) (citing Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589. 603 (1967): Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion). But see Island Trees. 457 U.S. at 915
(Rehnqulst, J., dissenting) (arguing that the recognized right to receive ideas does
not apply to school libraries).
75 Island Trees, 457 U.S. at 868. See also id. at 869 (asserting that the library of-
fers "a place to test or expand upon ideas presented" by others) (quoting Right to
Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 715 (D. Mass. 1978)).
76 Island Trees, 457 U.S. at 870, 872 (citing West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)); see also id. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (as-
serting that schools may not "strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.") (quoting Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. at 637).
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American, anti-Christian, anti-Sem[iltic [sic], and just plain
fflthy..
7
In Island Trees, as in every similar case involving the
Speech Clause that has reached a federal appellate court,
parents and their children presented mutual liberty claims.m
I am unaware of a reported case from any court in which mi-
nors and their parents advocated different positions with re-
gard to speech rights. Cases that have reached the Supreme
Court about the First Amendment rights of minors involve
fact situations in which the parents' and children's interests
were aligned- parents were arguing that their children pos-
sessed speech rights in situations where children and parents
shared a belief system. But common sense and experience
suggest that parents and children cannot share the same
views on matters touching the essence of belief systems with-
out exception.
The Supreme Court has never squarely considered the civil
liberties of children whose claims conflicted with the beliefs
and preferences of their parents. Variations to the facts in
some of the leading cases that involved merged claims of par-
ents and children, such as Wisconsin v. Yodero suggest the
77 Id. at 853.
78 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. DIst.. 393 U.S. 503. 516
(1989) (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the speech at Issue appeared to
emanate as much from the parents' views as from the children's): Wisconsin v. Yo-
der, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972) (Douglas, J.. dissenting) (the Issue of conflicts between
parents and children regarding exercise of First Amendment rights has never before
been squarely before the Court): see also Davis v. Page. 385 F. Supp. 395. 398 (D.
N.H. 1974) (elementary school-aged -children's asserted freedom of exercise of relig-
ion is, in essence, that of their parents.").
Throughout this article, my argument assumes that where more than one par-
ent is involved in a minor's life, those parents share the same value system and are
trying to enforce the same rules about the accessibility of Ideas. Surely this Is no
more realistic as a universal expectation than the assurance that children always
agree with their parents. The problems raised when the parents are divided is. how-
ever, beyond the scope of my current inquiry. See. e.g.. Ira C. Lupu. Mediating Insti-
ttions: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction: The Separation of Powers and the Pro-
tection of Children, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1317 (1994) (arguing that differences of opinion
among parents help to protect the rights of children).
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). For a discussion of the Impact of Justice Douglas'
dissenting opinion on advocates for children's rights, see Emily Buss. What Does
Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONsr L. 40, 40-41. 50-52 (1999) (arguing that mi-
nors should not be placed in a position that forces them to contradict their parents
in court).
Modest variations to other leading cases also underscore the significance of the
assumption that children and parents seek the same results under law. See. e.g..
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that the liberty interests of
parents allow them to choose whether to send their children to public or private
schools, including parochial schools); Meyer v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(holding that the state cannot prohibit the teaching of a legitimate subject that par-
ents desire their children to study). But see Prince v. Massachusetts. 321 U.S. 158
(1944) (stating that freedom of religion does not protect a guardian who allows a
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problem which is central to my argument.
In Yoder, Amish parents won a religious exemption from
compulsory school laws that would have required their chil-
dren to attend school beyond the eighth grade. The Amish
parents argued that high school attendance violated their re-
ligious beliefs and endangered their community's way of life."
Under very narrow conditions, arguably unique to the Amish,
the Supreme Court held that the interests of the Amish par-
ents in directing their children's upbringing outweighed the
state's interests in compulsory education. The Supreme
Court emphasized, however, that its holding in no way ad-
dressed any potential independent interests that Amish teen-
agers might have in continuing their education.1
In a partial dissent frequently cited by children's rights
advocates, Justice Douglas argued that a decision as mo-
mentous as quitting school must reflect the free exercise
claims of both the parents and their teenage children.' Jus-
tice Douglas argued that the Supreme Court could not im-
pute the parents' beliefs to the children who had not testified.
The state, according to Justice Douglas, could not permissi-
bly "impose the parents' notions of religious duty upon their
children," even if the parents could do so without the state's
assistance. Therefore, Justice Douglas dissented from the
holding insofar as it applied to the two remaining Amish
child to help her distribute religious materials in violation of child labor laws). In
Meyer and Pierce, the Court would have had to consider the children's rights inde-
pendently from their parents' rights if the children supported the state's regulations
regarding the acceptable parameters and sites of compulsory education. A similar
situation would have arisen if Betty, the child in Prince who shared her guardian's
religious faith, wanted to proselytize over the objections of her family. See Prince,
321 U.S. at 171-76 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should respect
Betty's belief that she will burn in Armageddon for all eternity If she does not prose-
lytize for her religion).
81 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 208-09.
82 Id. at 224-35 (emphasizing that the Amish had an established record of training
their children and providing them with employment in their own community).
Id. at 230-31 & n.21 (expressly noting that the children were not parties to the
litigation, the case is not being tried on the theory that children were being prevented
from attending school against their express desires, the one child who testified af-
firmed that her wishes corresponded to those of her parents, and it was the parents
who were subject to prosecution for failing to send their children to school): Id. at
237 (Stewart, J., concurring) (arguing that the case does not present "any questions
regarding the right[s] of the children of Amish parents" because there is no sugges-
tion that any of the children before the court differed in religions beliefs from their
parents).
Id. at 241-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) ("Where the child is mature
enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the
child's rights to permit such an imposition without canvassing his views.").
85 Id. at 242 (arguing that the State imposes on a child's liberty interests where it
enforces adherence to the parents' religious beliefs without at least "canvassing" the
child's own views).
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teenagers who did not testify at trial: Vernon Yutzy and Bar-
bara Miller. These young people, he insisted, "persons within
the meaning of the Bill of Rights" needed to be heard before
their parents' beliefs could cut off their choices about their
own futures by truncating their education.' The implications
of the right to receive information as applied to minors in this
kind of case are discussed infra in Part 1.C.
While the concerns that Justice Douglas voiced about
Barbara and Vernon may not arise very often, they capture a
real and poignant pattern in the lives of strictly religious
families. 8' In her novel, The Romance Reader, Pearl Abraham
describes the coming of age of Rachel, the daughter of a Ha-
sidic rabbi, who lives in an isolated community where diver-
sity is limited to different sects of strictly observant Jews.8
Rachel attends a parochial school for Hasidic girls. Her par-
ents forbid her from reading any books written in English.o
Still, Rachel pines after English-language novels, through
which she hopes to learn about "regular life."9 At age 12, she
wishes to have a library card. 91 The effort to obtain classics
like Jane Eyre, Little Women and Johnny Tremaine feels as
treacherous and shameful to Rachel as the search for illicit
drugs might be to others: "I think the whole world is looking
at me and knows exactly where I'mgoing," Rachel recalls, de-
scribing her first trip to the library. "On the bus, I can't de-
cide whether to get off in front of the library or a block
away .... I'm afraid to sit there reading, afraid someone will
see me.# 3 When Rachel's father complains that Rachel went
Id. at 242-43 (asserting that Yoder is the first case to squarely present a poten-
tial division between the liberty claims of parents and their children).
I am unaware of any estimates regarding how many young people find them-
selves in this predicament, but the numbers may be significant. especially in parts of
the country where young people depend on adults to drive them to places that are
inaccessible by public transportation.
88 PEARLABRAHAM, THE ROMANCE READER (1995). Hasidism Is a pietistic movement
that originated in Eastern Europe in the eighteenth century. It emphasizes tradi-
tional Jewish values and practices, and is distinguished by devotion to the Hasidic
sub-group's spiritual leader. See DEBRA RENEE KAUFMAN, RACHEL'S DAUGHTERS:
NEWLY ORTHODOX JEWISH WOMEN 176 nn.2-3 (1991). Like other branches of strict
Orthodox Judaism, its values and social structure are uncompromisingly patriar-
chal. See id. at 2-3 and passim.
89 The lack of access to information is not uncommon in traditionalist enclaves
regardless of religious persuasion. See, e.g., Timothy Egan. The Persistence of Polyg-
amy, N.Y. TIMES MAG. Feb. 28, 1999, at 51. 55 (noting the experience of Laura
Chapman, home schooled after age eleven by a plural marriage family that consid-
ered itself part of a Mormon fundamentalist community. who asserted. -When I fl-
nail97 got out, at age 28, I had the knowledge of the outside world of an I l-year-old').
ABRAHAM. supra note 88, at 35.
91 Id. at 31.
92Id.
931d.
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to the library without permission, the librarian sends Rachel
home. "If I tell her the truth," Rachel wonders, "will she help
me? Adopt me?"94 Ultimately, as the novel's title suggests,
Rachel succeeds in getting her library card. 95 For Rachel,
books do open a door to the world.96
C. Maturing Autonomy Rights Unavoidably Conflict with the
Constitutional Norm of Parental Control
Rachel's initial eviction from the public library resulted
from the librarian's intuitive application of the frequently re-
peated obiter dictum that "the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents."9 This principle domi-
nates the legal discussion of the relationship between family
privacy and the inculcation of parental values.98 Except in
instances of gross negligence and abuse,' at least in theory,
the state does not interfere with parental decisions about
childrearing, including decisions about which cultural norms
they choose to emphasize,'0° nor should it in a pluralistic so-
9 Id. at 33.
95 Id. at 39-40. Rachel plots to steal a paid utility bill from her father's study to
establish residency, but the only time she can get access to the room Is on the Sab-
bath, when exertion is forbidden: "I don't know which Is worse, going to the library
or stealing and breaking the law of Shabbat [sic], but I know what the prophet's
talking about when he says one sin begets another." Id. at 40.
9 See id. at 50.
97 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). The parental zone of pri-
vacy includes the right to choose which form of education the family will use to fulfill
the state's compulsory education requirements. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that the requirement that all children between eight and
sixteen attend public schools unconstitutionally interfered with parents' right to di-
rect the education of their children).
98 See Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 621 (1979) (Stewart J., concurring) (assert-
ing it is "a canon of the common law that parents speak for their minor children"):
Prince, 321 U.S. at 166, quoted in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972): see
also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (plurality opinion) (noting that In our
nation's history and tradition, parents have substantive authority over their chil-
dren); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (holding that the "primary role
of parents in the upbringing of their children Is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition"). See generally. Ross, supra note 5, at 1586-87: Bar-
bara Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns The Child?: Meyer and Pierce And The Child As
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992) (discussing the Importance of the values
of patriarchy in those two foundation cases).
Protection of children in such instances Is provided under statute, not based on
constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has rejected a claim that children and
their guardians have a cause of action based on the state's failure to protect them in
their homes. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989) (holding that the county had no duty under the Due Process Clause to protect
the boy against an abusive father's violence); see also Aviam Solfer, Moral Ambition,
Formalism, and the "Free World" of DeShaney, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1513 (1989)
(discussing and criticizing Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion).
100 Cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (protecting extended
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ciety. Conflicts between parents and the state over the incul-
cation of values bring the inherent tension between pluralism
and homogeneity to the forefront. The fears that Rachel's
father harbors about the risks involved in her exposure to
secular literature are well founded. It is essential to his belief
system and community that Rachel remain in his particular-
ized world when she grows up, just as it is important to the
Amish and other distinctive communities that their offspring
remain within the group. To Rachel's father, it may seem
that the ability to preserve the heritage that he and Rachel
share is a prerequisite for even circumscribed participation in
the broader society.
Although parents enjoy substantial control over their chil-
dren's access to information, the First Amendment requires a
distinction between familial and public efforts to restrict the
flow of information to young people. When a conflict between
parents and children arises, it is frequently unclear whether
the state should reinforce the parents' position, remain neu-
tral, or even facilitate the minor's efforts. The answer to the
dilemma depends on the nature of the conflict, the maturity
of the child, and the stakes. Any public efforts to enforce pa-
rental restrictions on a mature minor's effort to receive
speech involve state action. My argument suggests that
where certain conditions are satisfied, state restrictions in
service of parental censorship violate a minor's individual
right to knowledge.
1. Privately Enforced Restrictions on the Flow of Infornation to
Minors
Minors have no constitutional rights inside their parents'
homes vis-a-vis their parents, at least in part because their
parents are not state actors.'0 ' At home, minors possess
neither freedom of speech nor its reciprocal right, the right to
receive information, unless their parents choose to grant
them such privileges.'" The right proposed here would pre-
family members' rights to live together).
101 For example, while parents may force their children to observe the family's
faith, the state may not do so directly. See Yoder. 406 U.S. at 242 (Douglas. J.. dis-
senting) (considering whether the state may be able to override the parents' objec-
tions if an Amish child desires to attend high school): see also Nunez v. City of San
Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944-45 (9th Cr. 1997) (distinguishing between state-imposed
and parentally-imposed curfews).
102 Consistent with the argument set forth here, parents may require their une-
mancipated minor children to worship with them and may impose a bedtime and a
curfew. See John E. Coons et al.. Puzzling Over Children's Rights. 1991 BYU L REv.
307, 343-47 (observing that children can be forced to attend the church or school of
their parents' choice).
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sumably arise primarily in the context of libraries and other
governmental activities designed to promote the marketplace
of ideas. 3 Ideally, the right would help to establish norms of
behavior that would only rarely need enforcement through
litigation.'04
There is of course a distinction between limiting the ideas
to which a preschooler is exposed and limiting those that
reach an adolescent. Parental efforts to limit the latter may
be doomed to failure, except where families have structured
their lives to avoid interaction with pervasive popular culture.
The law recognizes that maturation is a gradual process, so
specific autonomy claims gain credibility in relation to the
youngster's capacities.'O Regardless of the child's age, par-
ents possess impressive sources of power that they can use to
impose their codes of behavior on children who live at home,
including the minor's emotional and financial dependency."°
In the most extreme cases, minors who challenge parental
authority may find themselves committed to psychiatric hos-
pitals,' committed to state institutions as incorrigible,' or
103 This discussion focuses on the right to receive information that is already cir-
culating in the general marketplace of ideas, as distinguished from the effort to gain
access to ideas that the speaker has not agreed to release. See generally, Schuloff v.
Fields, 950 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying an adoptee access to adoption rec-
ords because the right to receive ideas does not allow the prospective recipient to
compel a speaker to provide information). But see Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adop-
tion, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case for Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 113, 113-143 (1999) (arguing that adoptees should have a right to infor-
mation about their biological families); Thomas I. Emerson, The First Amendment
And The Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 13-17 (1977) (discussing the impor-
tance of laws requiring disclosure of government data in the context of the right to
know as an element of a functioning democracy).
'04 Cf Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hlaleah, 508 U.S. 520, 523
(1993) (Kennedy, J.) (asserting that "Itihe principle that government may not enact
laws that suppress religious belief or practice is so well understood that few viola-
tions are recorded in our opinions").
105 See Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental Barriers to the Empowerment of
Child Clients, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 895 (1999) (asserting that the development of ca-
pacity defies the bright lines favored by the law).
106 See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. For Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 526 (1990) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (stating that because of a minor's emotional vulnerability and
financial dependency, "a parental notice statute is tantamount to a parental consent
requirement"); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 438-39 & n.24 (1981) (Marshall, J..
dissenting) (addressing the case of a minor who expected family conflict over the
abortion decision, and who believed that she should be able to proceed with an
abortion without notifying her parents in violation of a Utah statute); Ross, supra
note 5. at 1594.
107 See Ross, supra note 5. at 1580-82 (discussing abuse of parental control over
"voluntary" psychiatric commitment).
108 See, e.g., In re Andrew R., 454 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Fam. Ct. 1982) (finding that An-
drew's commitment to a treatment center for seven months based solely on his par-
ents' petition violated his fundamental liberty interest in the absence of review by a
neutral factfinder).
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even forced out onto the streets.' °9 Such possibilities dimin-
ish the likelihood that large numbers of minors will challenge
parental authority publicly by claiming the rights urged here.
According to the psychological sciences, looking outward
and testing parental premises are an essential aspect of
maturation during the teenage years."' Many theories of
adolescent development emphasize that a successful resolu-
tion to adolescence and the maturation process includes,
among other things, separation from the parents and devel-
opment of a sexual identity and a personal moral values sys-
tem, followed by an ability to return to the parental circle
based on a position of relative equality as a young adult."'
These stages of development are consistent with, and fre-
quently mirror, the types of normative autonomy claims at is-
sue in legal debates about the scope of rights for minors.
The concept of gradually emerging autonomy is reflected in
our jurisprudence as well as in social science literature. It is
closely associated with the notion of the teenager's own en-
hanced capacities and diminishing vulnerabilities. The
chronological age of the minor is a significant, though not a
determinative, factor.112  No precise chronology provides a
bright line indicating when specific autonomy rights ripen." '
A bright line case might arise in the unlikely event that a
sheltered girl who will turn eighteen the day before an elec-
tion were denied access to political literature which she
needed to become an informed voter. Usually, the margins of
maturity are murkier.
In Bellotti v. Baird the Supreme Court laid out three fac-
tors that have traditionally been used to justify distinguishing
the rights of minors from those of adults: (i) the "peculiar
vulnerability" of children; (ii) their presumed "inability to
make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner"; and
109 See Gregory A. Loken. "Thrownaway" Children and Throwaway Parenthood. 68
TEMP. L. REV. 1715 (1995); see also Carol Sanger & Eleanor Wllemsen. Minor
Changes: Enmnc~pattng Children in Modern Times. 25 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM.1 239.
277-83 (1992) (discussing the abandonment or neglect of teenagers).
110 This view may come as a shock to those who lament the negative influence of
television, music, film, and video games on young people.
. See JOHN E. SCHOWALTER. M.D. & WALTER R ANYAN, M.D.. THE FAMILY HANDBOOK
OF ADOLESCENCE 302-03 (1979) (describing The Group for the Advancement of Psy-
chiatry's six criteria to be used to determine the resolution of adolescence).
112 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville. 422 U.S. 205. 214 n. 11( 1975) (discussing
how age is a significant factor in deciding "whether a minor has the requisite capac-
ity for individual choice) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503. 513
(1969)); see also Peck v. Upshur County Bd. of Educ.. 155 F.3d 274. 287-88 (4th Cir.
1998) (anticipating that the Supreme Court would distinguish young elementary
school students from older children in terms of their ability to distinguish private
religious speech from government speech).
' See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 52. 74 (1976).
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(iii) the significance of the "parental role in child rearing."" '
The Supreme Court explained that "mature minors" possess
greater rights under the Constitution than their immature
counterparts, but did not spell out how to determine whether
an individual minor should be deemed "mature."
115
Lower courts have struggled to define maturity in minors,
generally relying on ad hoc, subjective evaluations."6  Pre-
sumably, the less an adolescent appears peculiarly vulner-
able, and the more the adolescent displays a capacity to
make informed, critical decisions, the more he or she satisfies
the definition of a "mature minor." The second factor, the ca-
pacity to incorporate and analyze information, is central to
the claim to a right to receive ideas, because the very search
for knowledge suggests that a person understands the im-
portance of becoming informed and intends to use informa-
tion to make rational choices.
2. State Enforcement of Parental Limitations on Access to
Information
As children grow older, most families share the job of edu-
cation with schools,17 which work to inculcate "fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
14 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (plurality opinion).
115 See ic. at 640-43 (holding that mature minors have a constitutional right to
obtain abortions without parental consent under certain circumstances, but provid-
ing no guidance to the lower courts about how to ascertain maturity, resulting in an
ad hoc application of the concept). But see In re Doe, 866 P.2d 1069, 1074 (Kan. Ct,
App. 1994). In In re Doe, the court held that in the absence of a definition of the
meaning of "mature and well-informed" under Bellott. a minor need not be "extraor-
dinarily mature" to be deemed mature under state law. Rather the minor should
meet a working definition of having "the intellectual capacity, experience, and knowl-
edge necessary to substantially understand the situation at hand and the conse-
quences of the choices that can be made." Id.
16 See, e.g., In re Jane Doe I, 566 N.E.2d 1181, 1185 (Ohio 1990) (Moyer. C.J.,
dissenting) (stating that the state's highest court has a responsibility to define "ma-
turity" in minors to assist trial courts in exercising their discretion). Factors used by
lower courts include the ability to comprehend the significance and consequences of
choices, age, work experience, living experience, intelligence, responsibility and free-
dom from undue influence. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 558 N.W.2d 784,787-88
(Neb. 1997); In re Jane Doe I, 566 N.E.2d at 1184; H.B. v. Wilkinson, 639 F. Supp.
952, 952-54 (D. Utah 1986); In re Doe, 866 P.2d at 1073-74.
117 A growing number of families do not share the job of education with schools.
Home schooling has become increasingly common during the last decade. Since
1993, home schooling has been legal in all fifty states and current estimates suggest
that approximately 1.5 million children are being educated at home by a parent. See
Barbara Kantrowitz & Pat Wingert, Learning At Home: Does It Pass the Test?,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5, 1998, at 64; see also Ira C. Lupu, supra note 79, at 1357-58 (ar-
guing that children need multiple adult influences and that home schooling does not
command the level of constitutional protection its proponents claim).
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system." "" Instead of offering a menu of values, "9 however,
most public schools accommodate parental choices by allow-
ing parents to opt their children out of specific programs, as-
signments, and so forth. 20 Parents frequently seek exemp-
tions for their children from subjects such as sex education,
evolution, music and art. The practice of excusing students
from coursework that their parents find objectionable raises
the difficult question of how to balance the state's constitu-
tionally mandated tolerance for pluralism against the prefer-
ences of parents with particularistic agendas. The problem
arises more broadly in arenas where the state, rather than
the family, controls the flow of information, such as in librar-
ies and public schools.
21
Some parents strive to create a uniquely tailored curricu-
118 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68. 77 (1979): see also West Va. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (stating that schools' responsibility to "educatiel
the young for citizenship" includes transmitting respect for -scrupulous protection of
Constitutional freedoms of the individual").
119 Schools may inculcate nonsectarian value systems, and may also restrict the
flow of information within the school in an effort to instill "the shared values of a
civilized social order." Bethel Sch. DisL No. 403 v. Fraser. 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)
(holding that a student may be penalized for delivering a speech containing -offen-
sively lewd and indecent" innuendo at a school assembly).
120 In Minnesota, for example, a statute requires schools to allow parents to review
curricular materials and mandates that schools provide alternative materials to re-
place those that parents find objectionable for any reason. See MINN. STAT. ArM. §
126.699 (West 1994). Pursuant to this statute, parents In at least one school district
objected to "computer technology, drug education, self-esteem training. certain
books and audio and visual presentations, and sex education." Stark v. Independent
Sch. Dist No. 640, 123 F.3d 1068. 1072 (8th Cir. 1997): see also MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. LXXI § 32A (West 1998) (requiring that school districts notify parents of the
content of any curriculum primarily involving "human sexual education or human
sexuality" and afford parents a flexible way of exempting their children from such
curricula upon written notice to the school), VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-207-2 (Michie
1998) (giving public school parents the right to review "the complete family life cur-
ricula [sic], including all supplemental materials").
According to People for the American Way, a progressive public interest group.
nearly every school district in the country allows parents "to opt their own children
out of sexuality and AIDS education, as well as out of specific activities or assign-
ments that conflict with their religious beliefs." PEOPLE FOR THE A.MERICAN WAY. A
RIGHT WING AND A PRAYER: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT AND YOUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS 60 (1997)
(hereinafter RIGHT WING AND A PRAYER]. This civil liberties watchdog group notes that
"preventing one's own child from using materials or participating In a program. an
appropriate exercise of parental rights, is not censorship." even where the parents
have selected a school outside their own public system. Id. at 30.
121 The problem of whose values should be taught In public schools may appear to
be intractable. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641 ("Probably no deeper division of our
people could proceed from any provocation than from finding It necessary to choose
what doctrine and whose program public educational officials shall compel youth to
unite in embracing."); see also William Buss, School Newspapers. Publtc Forum. and
the First Amendment, 74 IOWA L. REV. 505. 506 (1989) (discussng the "conundrum"
of whether public schools can inculcate majoritarian values while fostering plural-
ism).
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lum that reflects their personal preferences. 22  Reported
cases make clear the extent to which this practice of parents
"opting out" on behalf of their children generally goes un-
questioned." Controversies arise primarily when families or
advocacy groups challenge the general availability of cur-
ricular, optional or library materials that their own children
are already effectively prevented from reading except by
stealth.' Some parents even try to shelter their children
122 See Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir.
1998) (holding that parents do not have a constitutional right to "pick and choose"
which courses their children will take at a public school); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer
Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996)
(stating that the right to rear one's children does not create a right to "dictate the
curriculum" at the public school they attend). One should note that Hot, Sexy and
Safer Productions, a commercial company, made an interactive presentation to stu-
dents that many parents might reasonably find was in questionable taste.
123 See, e.g., Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1024 (9th
Cir. 1998) (describing a school decision that allowed plaintiff African-American stu-
dent to leave class discussion of Huckleberry Finn and another book that used the
derogatory term "nigger"); Coleman v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 635 So.2d 1238, 1247,
1266 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1994) (noting that under state law, a child may be excused
from sex education instruction "at the option of his or her parent or guardians"):
Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 73
n.3, 80 n.15 (Ct. App. 1975) (stating that parents may request that their children be
excused from sex education courses and Bible reading, and "[n]o child may attend a
class if a request that he not attend the class has been received by the school");
Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 289 A.2d 914, 921 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1971) (iden-
tifying plaintiff parents' application for a temporary injunction barring a health edu-
cation curriculum in part because the parents did not "sincerely and seriously" pur-
sue exemption from the challenged curriculum for their own children). Cf. Mozert v.
Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (reversing a district
court decision which held that a school must continue to accommodate parental re-
quests for exemption from assignments as a matter of law); Davis v. Page, 385 F.
Supp. 395 (D. N.H. 1974) (holding that there is no constitutional violation where a
school requires students to remain in the classroom to watch movies, listen to mu-
sic, sing, dance and receive education over the religious objections of their parents).
124 Litigation against school districts over learning materials normally ensues after
parents who have been allowed to modify the academic program presented to their
own children proceed to seek removal of material of which they disapprove from cir-
culation to any students within the school. See, e.g., Montelro, 158 F.3d at 1024
(parents seek to force school to remove books from the curriculum); Campbell v. St.
Tammany Parish, 64 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 1995) (remanding for inquiry into the school
board's motivation for removing a history of voodoo from the school library); Pratt v.
Independent Sch. Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding uncon-
stitutional a school board decision to remove a controversial film from the school
curriculum, rather than accepting a sub-committee recommendation that all parents
receive an information sheet advising them that they could exclude their children
from viewing the films). On remand, St. Tammany Parish was resolved under a con-
sent decree, which limited access to the book to students in eighth grade or above
who had written parental permission to see the volume. See Sarah Shipley. St.
Tammany Settles 'Voodoo' Suit, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Apr. 2, 1996, at Bl:
see also, RIGHT WING AND A PRAYER supra note 119, at 32-34 (describing incidents in
Alaska, Georgia and Illinois where parents, who had already been allowed to shelter
their own children from material they deemed objectionable, sought to remove said
material from general use in the schools).
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from the enunciated values of the non-public schools to
which they have elected to send their children.'25 In yet an-
other kind of controversy, parents may challenge a decision
to shelter all children from material that one group labels
objectionable."2m
The central legal question posed by these fact patterns is
where the state's primary obligation lies when controversy
over values arise in the public sphere. One approach sug-
gests that the state's goal should be to sustain a neutral
marketplace of ideas within the school to the extent that do-
ing so is compatible with curricular goals. A second view
would enlist the state as an agent that reinforces the individ-
ual parent's authority over values.'27 Yet another approach,
reflected here, suggests that to the extent that the state en-
forces deference to each family's values by diminishing the le-
12 Parents may even seek to restrict what a child hears in private schools that ex-
ist to foster a particular religion. Under the laws governing a school voucher system
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a parent may use public funds to send a child to a paro-
chial school and then demand that the religious school allow that child to 'opt out'
of any curricular material that offends the parent. See Jackson v. Benson. 578
N.W.2d 602, 609 (Wis. 1997). cert. denied. 119 S. CL 466 (1998). This provision re-
flects the high level of discretion given to parents to control what Ideas their children
receive in a variety of school settings.
In an unusual case, a Roman Catholic family in Florida objected to the family
education text used in more than 5,000 Catholic schools in the United States. h-
tially, the school allowed the children to leave during the brief section on sexuality.
The parents then demanded that their children be sheltered completely from the
textbook, because if they had access to the book they could read the pages on sex.
The school refused to release the children from the general family life curriculum.
arguing that it was "a Catholic school. If we don't teach morality, there's no reason
for the children to be here." Dateline NBC: Unorthodox behavior?: Anderson family
clashes with Catholic school over issue of sex education In school texts and classroom.
(NBC television broadcast, June 29. 1998). available in \VESTLAW. 1998 WL
6615609. Lawsuits and expulsion followed. The children now attend public school.
where under state law they can be excused from sex education based on a note from
their parents. Id. The results of the litigation appear to be unreported.
126 A school may not modify its entire curriculum to conform to parental sectarian
beliefs. See Edwards v. Aguillard. 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987) (striking down a state
statute that allowed schools to bar the teaching of evolution to satisfy sectarian con-
cerns); Epperson v. Arkansas. 393 U.S. 97. 106 (1968) (same): Pratt. 670 F.2d at
776-77 (finding that a school violates students' right to receive information when It
bans classroom use of a controversial film with educational value). But see Stark v.
Independent Sch. Dist. No. 640, 123 F.3d 1068 (1997) (upholding creation of a pub-
lic charter school that conforms to sectarian beliefs but allows students to receive
broader instruction by travelling to another district school), analyzed with other
forms of accommodation to parental preferences in Catherine J. Ross. Accommoda-
tion in Public Schools: Who Decides What Children Learn?. Comments at the Com-
munitarian Summit, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 27. 1999) (on file with University of
Pennsylvania Journal of Consitutional Law).
127 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse. A Public Role in the Private Family: The Pa-
rental Rights and Responsibilities Act and the Politics of Child Protection and Educa-
tion, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 393, 411-13 (1996) (criticizing this line of authority as part of a
conservative political agenda).
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gitimacy of the minor's independent claims, the state actually
denigrates the pluralism its institutions are intended to fos-
ter.
Where the views of parent and child coincide, the student's
right to receive information does not pose a constitutional ob-
stacle to voluntary accommodation of a family's preferences.
If a teenager were to challenge her school's accommodation of
her parent's request to opt out of a course based solely on the
parents' religious beliefs, the case would raise questions of
first impression, explored further in Part II, infra. If a mature
minor sought access to information that the state generally
made available to her peers, her search would trigger the
principle that "the State may not, consistently with the spirit
of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available
knowledge."l
The seminal insight that "knowledge is power" underscores
the potential for harm posed by exaggerated public deference
to parents who fear that a free flow of ideas to their young-
sters outside of the home will undermine family values and
authority. Young people instinctively understand the signifi-
cance of parental mediation of ideas. A seventh grader,
seeking to identify a contemporary equivalent for the mind-
washing in Aldous Huxley's Brave New World did not hesitate
in stating that parents have the capacity to be "mind-
washers."
The right to receive information is integrally related to any
effort to achieve the individual self-realization that is essen-
tial to the structure of the First Amendment. 30 In that sense,
the right to receive information is reinforced when it is com-
bined with other autonomy claims protected under the Con-
stitution, as will be discussed in Part II.
II. APPLYING THE RIGHT OF MATURE MINORS TO RECEIVE
INFORMATION TO THE EXERCISE OF ACKNOWLEDGED
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
In certain privacy areas concerning autonomy, the courts
have expressly recognized individual interests for mature mi-
nors who, by definition, do not lack the capacity to exercise
constitutional liberties. Indeed, under Bellotti, one of the in-
12 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
129 Personal communication from Daniel Ross-Rieder. It can be difficult for a
young person to discover his or her own views, even where parents rarely make ma-
terials inaccessible. This insight is consistent with the analogy between minors and
prisoners discussed in From Vulnerability to Voice, supra note 5, at 1601-14.
,30 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (asserting "Itlhe right of freedom of speech ...
includes the right to receive, the right to read.., and the freedom of inquiry").
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didae of a mature minor is the "[ability to make critical deci-
sions in an informed... manner." 13 Similarly, a mature mi-
nor is possessed of something approaching the "full capacity
for individual choice which is the presupposition of First
Amendment guarantees."32 Individual choice is probably
most meaningful when choices are informed decisions, and
decision-makers have access to a variety of viewpoints before
making critical decisions. It is implicit in the Supreme
Court's recognition of autonomy rights for mature minors
that, to the extent those autonomy rights exist, minors have
rights, commensurate with those of adults, to speech that will
enable them to make informed choices.
The problem of the minor's right to information may ini-
tially appear to present the classic case in which "two funda-
mental constitutional rights appear to be at odds."'3 Parental
authority seems pitted against the emerging autonomy of
maturing minors. That formulation, however, exaggerates the
conflict. The right to receive information applies in respect to
the state, as represented by such bodies as schools, libraries
and public health clinics. Parents, in contrast, cannot be re-
quired to provide to their children information that under-
mines the beliefs parents are trying to instill.' Further, par-
ents have great advantages in the marketplace of ideas.
First, parents have the earliest and most consistent opportu-
nities to indoctrinate their children. Second, parents make
all critical decisions about what information to make avail-
able to their children while the children are in their most
formative years." Third, parents have an ongoing opportu-
nity to help their children to think critically about conflicting
ideas and ideologies.'4
13 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622. 634 (1979) (plurality opinion).
13 Id. at 635 n.13 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629. 649 (1968)).
13 Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist, 158 F.3d 1022. 1024 (9th Cir. 1998)
(discussing the "particularly difficult... clash" between the right of students to read
Huckleberry Finn and the right of African-American students to be free from a ra-
cialy hostile environment).
Professor Lupu argues that children benefit when more than one adult within a
family makes decisions about child-rearing because the differing perspectives and
values of the adults increase the sources of information available to the child. See
Lupu supra note 79, at 1332.
13 Parental choices include decisions that result from voluntary delegation of
childcare duties and about matters such as how much television their children
watch. For purposes of this discussion, I assume that parents have retained legal
and daily custody of their children, without involvement of. for example. the child
welfare or foster care systems.
1' 3 This point is well illustrated in Monteiro:
"Mhe fact that a student is required to read a book does not mean that he is
being asked to agree with what is in IL It cannot be disputed that a necessary
component of any education is learning to think critically about offensive
ideas- without that ability one can do little to respond to them.
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Nonetheless, rights are not absolute. This is especially
true where minors are concerned, as demonstrated above.
The three jurisprudential cornerstones that support a minor's
right to receive information suggest limiting principles. Mi-
nors' rights to receive information will be strongest where it is
used to impart meaning to another fundamental right. The
state cannot, consistent with the right to receive information,
enforce parental restrictions on access to information needed
to invoke a protected liberty interest. These presumptions
are applicable where the minor who seeks to be treated as
mature under the law confronts a decision that meets the
following three criteria: (i) the decision must be significant,
and implicate constitutionally recognized liberties; (ii) the de-
cision will not be effective if it is postponed; and (iii) the re-
sults of the decision are irrevocable.
A young woman's decision about whether or not to have
an abortion clearly satisfies all three of these criteria. There
is a constitutional right to an abortion;1 37 under law an abor-
tion must be performed by a certain point in the pregnancy or
not at all,'"8 and no matter which decision a woman makes,
the result (birth or termination) is irrevocable. The same
girl's decision to marry could, arguably, be postponed. In
deference to the respect the law traditionally accords to pa-
rental control of minors, the right to know, as discussed here,
is proposed for situations involving hybrid rights. In such
situations, realization of other constitutional rights depends
on access to information, and those rights cannot be exer-
cised meaningfully if the young person must wait until the
age of majority.1
39
Nothing inherent in the right of minors to receive informa-
tion suggests that a minor seeking knowledge would come
from a family that adheres to an orthodox religious tradition.
The following discussion draws heavily from examples in-
158 F.3d at 1031.
137 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing a constitutional right to
abortion).
13 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (affirming states'
power to restrict abortion after the point of fetal viability).
139 It may seem that the right to receive information advocated here should extend
to all efforts of mature minors to obtain information that will assist the quest for
identity formation, whether or not they are supported by constitutional claims. I am
not prepared to make such a broad claim, in part because the justifications for the
child's interest as opposed to the parents' privileges would seem less urgent and less
compelling. The constitutional claim of mature minors to information over parental
objection is strongest when the information will serve constitutionally protected lib-
erty interests, the exercise of which cannot be postponed. The limitations I suggest
here are designed to accord respect to the parental role in child rearing, to draw lines
that will avoid a slippery slope and to present factual situations that make the
strongest case for the right I propose.
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volving deeply religious families, in part because case law
suggests that these are the families most likely to attempt to
restrict their children's access to competing world views.4
Religious beliefs may also create a competing "hybrid claim"
in which the assertion of parental rights is strengthened by
the accompanying assertion of a free exercise claim."' Relig-
ion is not, however, a prerequisite. Any deeply held and con-
tracted set of beliefs might place a teenager in dire need of
information. If, for example, the teenage son of confirmed
atheist Madalyn Murray were dying, and his mother barred
him from seeking out religious ideas, 2 the right proposed
here would apply. This right to information would also apply
if parents imposed on their children a set of beliefs that
stemmed from entirely secular sources which resulted in the
state limiting the information that reached those children."
The claim that minors have a right to receive information
is sharply framed where minors have a cognizable claim to
'40 See, e.g., Stark v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 640. 123 F.3d 1068. 1070 (8th
Cir. 1997) (analyzing the constitutional issues relating to the establishment of a
school by a religious group that has a "sincerely held religious belief In avoiding the
use of technology .... ); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395 (D. N.H. 1974) (reviewing a
civil rights claim brought on behalf of elementary school children by their father an
the grounds that the school's policy to require students to remain In classrooms
while religiously offensive activities took place violates the children's constitutional
rights); Coleman v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 635 So.2d 1238 (La. CL App. 1994) (ad-
dressing an action brought by parents on behalf of their children to enjoin the use of
sex education curricula by the school).
141 See Employment Div.. Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872. 881-
82 (1990) (discussing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205. 215-19 (1972)). In Smith.
the Supreme Court reinterpreted Yoder and other free exercise cases to stand for the
principle that the First Amendment only bars application of a neutral, generally ap-
plicable law over religious objections when those objections are asserted "in con-
junction with other constitutional protections" such as the right to direct the up-
bringing of one's children. This has come to be known as a "hybrid right." Id. My
suggestion here that two liberty claims may be mutually reinforcing should not be
interpreted as approval of the doctrine enunciated in Smith. For criUcisms of the
limitation of Yoder announced In Smith. see Smith. 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor. J..
concurring); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye. Inc. v. City of Hlaleah. 508
U.S. 520, 566-67 (1993) (Souter. J., concurring); Douglas Laycock. The Remnants of
Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. Cr. REV. 1; Michael W. McConnell. Free Exercise Reviston-
ism and theSmith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109 (1990).
142 See Murray v. Curlett, 179 A.2d 698. 699 (Md. 1962) (stating that in actuality.
Ms. Murray and her son informed the court that they were both atheists). revd sub
nom. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding
that state action requiring public schools to begin each day with reading from the
Bible and recitation of the Lord's Prayer violates the Establishment Clause of the
U.S. Constitution).
143 See Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454.462 (2d Cir. 1996). cert. de-
nied, 519 U.S. 813 (1996) (concluding that where parents seek to exempt their child
from educational requirements based on purely secular values, the state need only
show a rational basis for the educational requirement).
Dec. 19991
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
autonomy rights regardless of their parents' preferences."' 4
These rights include, among others, (i) the right to an abor-
tion without parental notice or consent;145 (ii) the right to
contraception and sexuality; 146 and (iii) the right to exercise
autonomous religious beliefs, 4 as posed in the opening hy-
pothetical of the teenager dying from leukemia. Considera-
tion of the right to receive information in conjunction with
rights claims in these three areas indicates that information
is indispensable to the meaningful exercise of liberties for
mature minors as well as for adults.' 48
A. Abortion
Adolescent girls whose views on abortion differ from those
of their parents may find themselves in particular jeopardy in
families that are deficient in meaningful communication. 149
Deeply held moral beliefs about abortion on both sides of the
debate ignite a rare "clash of absolutes."'50 Part I of this arti-
cle sets out a three-part justification for recognizing the right
of minors to receive information even in the face of their par-
ents' objections. First, the right to receive information is rec-
ognized for adults as an integral aspect of freedom of speech.
Second, minors possess rights under the Speech Clause, even
in controlled environments such as schools. Third, where
minors assert constitutional rights independent of their par-
144 See Buckholz v. Levefile, 194 N.W.2d 427, 429 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (finding no
authority requiring a minor to have the consent of his or her parents to sue to en-
force constitutional liberties).
145 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (holding "that a
state may require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or
guardian, provided that there is an adequate Judicial bypass procedure.") (emphasis
added).
146 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (stating that
"[slince the state may not impose a blanket prohibition, or even a blanket require-
ment of parental consent, on the choice of a minor to terminate her pregnancy, the
constitutionality of a blanket prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to mi-
nors is afortiori foreclosed").
'47 The Supreme Court has never dealt squarely with this Issue, but it has recog-
nized the state's interest in protecting minors' rights to grow into independent citi-
zens. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
148 In this sense, the right of mature minors to receive information may be viewed
as a hybrid right in which the assertion of the right to receive Information and the
assertion of another autonomous right mutually reinforce each other. See discus-
sion of hybrid rights supra note 140. The Idea that rights may be mutually rein-
forcing should not normally mean that neither right could be asserted independ-
ently.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 203, 209-10 (1990) (ar-
guing that in families where communication has broken down, parental consent or
notification laws are unlikely to "facilitate respectful dialogue between children In
crisis and their parents").
15o See generally id.
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ents' claims, the state may not reinforce parental limitations
by constricting access to information that is available to oth-
ers. The problem of the abortion decision builds smoothly on
these principles.
In the "ideal" family, a girl would be able- and even ea-
ger- to seek a parent's advice upon learning that she was
pregnant. In some families, however, such communication is
or feels unattainable. During the process of considering
what to do, the girl who cannot confide in her parents must
determine what her medical options are, how those mesh
with her belief system, and what legal steps she must take if
she decides to seek an abortion without her parents' consent.
All of these decisions require knowledge. If the adolescent
goes to a privately funded clinic she may receive comprehen-
sive information, including the advice that she consult with a
parent or other adult if possible.'5 ' If, however, she relies on
a publicly funded clinic that is barred by statute from dis-
pensing information about abortion, she may not fully under-
stand the procedures available to her or the medical advan-
tages of acting quickly if she decides to terminate the
pregnancy.' - ' As Justice Blackmun argued in his dissenting
opinion in Rust v. Sullivan, "it is of no small significance that
the speech... suppress[ed]" about abortion by federal regu-
lations applicable to clinics receiving federal funds "is truthful
information regarding constitutionally protected conduct of
vital importance to the listener. " '5
The Supreme Court has held that states which require pa-
rental consent for abortions performed on minors must pro-
vide a judicial bypass procedure that allows the minor to es-
151 Courts regularly distinguish the -ideal" family, which legislatures apparently
have in mind when they enact regulations limiting the ability of a teenager to obtain
an abortion, from the families in which the difficulty of securing parental consent
creates social and legal problems. See Hodgson v. Minnesota. 497 U.S. 417. 418
(1990).
152 The majority of pregnant minors do consult with their parents. See American
Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal.2d 546. 561 (CL App. 1994). For some
adolescents, however, such consultation "simply is not a reasonable possibility." Id.
(stating that even the state's witnesses conceded that many families have none of the
attributes for coping effectively with family problems. and noting that the trial court
found that compelling a minor from an abusive family to discuss her pregnancy with
heruparents could endanger the girl's physical and mental safety).
See id. at 560 (citing evidence which shows that standardized nondirective
protocols encourage teenagers to consult their parents and provide "a wealth of In-
formation and counseling designed to ensure that they understand and truly con-
sent to whatever medical decision they ultimately make").
"4 See id. at 561-62 (noting that minors in states having parental consent statutes
delay the decision to undergo an abortion, and that the residual risk of abortion In-
creases as pregnancy advances).
155 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173. 215 (1991) (Blackmun. J.. dissenting). It is Ir-
relevant that Rust Involved communication between doctors and adult women.
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tablish, among other things, that she is mature enough and
well enough informed to make an independent decision. 56
Since maturity is already defined in part by a showing that
the teenager is informed and is able to use information ra-
tionally, knowledge therefore carries double weight in an
abortion bypass hearing - that is, the minor must demon-
strate knowledge to show maturity and once again must
demonstrate the ability to make this particular independent
decision. This weighing of knowledge in the abortion context
makes access to information imperative.
In most areas of the country,"' "only an infinitesimal
number" of petitions seeking abortion without parental con-
sent have been denied.RI8 In the rare instances in which
judges deny a parental bypass petition, they focus heavily on
the depth of the petitioner's knowledge. The Supreme Court
of Nebraska, for example, concluded that a pregnant thirteen-
year-old ninth grader failed to demonstrate her maturity by
clear and convincing evidence because she "was unable to
communicate to the judge a sufficient understanding of the
medical procedure involved, [or] the associated risks" of an
abortion.- 9 At trial, the girl had testified that she understood
the risks to include "bad cramps or you may get something
up inside you that could cause risks."' 60 Although she had
received information and counseling from Planned Parent-
hood and had discussed the implications and risks of an
abortion with an older married sister who gave "the minor all
1 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (plurality opinion) (holding
that the judicial bypass procedure must allow the minor to establish that the abor-
tion would be in her "best interests," and furthermore, ensure her anonymity and be
expedited); see also Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 293 (1997) (holding that a
judicial bypass allowing waiver of notice requirement if not in the minor's best inter-
est was sufficient to protect a minor's right to an abortion); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (holding that a parental consent statute only passes
constitutional muster if it contains a method by which the minor can obtain an
abortion without parental consent); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S.
502, 510-13 (1990) (restating the four criteria that make a bypass procedure con-
stitutionally acceptable, but declining to decide whether a parental notification stat-
ute, as opposed to a parental consent statute, must provide for a judicial bypass
proceeding).
'57 The opinions in bypass hearings are reported only if the trial court judge denies
the petition. Many of the reported cases on parental consent come from Alabama.
See Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 77, 110 n. 159 (1995).
1 American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal.2d 546, 555-56 (Ct. App.
1994) (holding that consent requirements for abortions violate privacy rights and do
not serve the statute's enunciated goals); see also TRIBE, supra note 145, at 209
(noting that only nine of 3,573 petitions in Minnesota were denied during the first
four-and-one-half years of the statute's operation).
159 In re Anonymous 1, 558 N.W.2d 784, 788 (Neb. 1997).
160 Id. at 787.
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the information she could," the court held that the petitioner
displayed an inadequate command of the medical issues to
support a finding of maturity.' The court placed a heavy
burden on this young girl. It is doubtful that most adults
display any greater retention and comprehension of the medi-
cal risks explained to them before they undergo what they re-
gard as a routine procedure. m The failure to seek and obtain
information and then to comprehend it fully appears to be
one of the most fatal mistakes a minor can make in preparing
for a bypass proceeding.'6m
Judges hearing bypass petitions also appear to have little
sympathy for girls who fail to learn about and use contracep-
tion. r The worst case alternative- unwanted pregnancy--
underscores the importance of access to information about
contraception and sexual activity, both of which are consid-
ered in the next section of this article.
B. Contraception and Sexuality
Not much has changed since Justice Stevens observed in
1985 that "it cannot go without notice that adolescent chil-
dren apparently have a pressing need for information about
contraception. " 6 Fascination with romance, sexuality and
sex are undeniably part of normal adolescent development
regardless of whether fantasy and speculation lead to activity.
This reality has hardly escaped the attention of leading ju-
rists. At oral argument in the Supreme Court in Reno v.
161 Id.
16 Cf. H.B. v. Wilkinson, 639 F. Supp. 952. 957-58 (D. Utah 1986) (denying the
bypass application of a bright, "sufficiently mature" seventeen-year-old because.
among other things, she did not fully appreciate the necessity of revealing her secret
pregnancy if medical complications were to result from the proposed abortion or the
risk of post-abortion depression.)
163 See, e.g., In re Anonymous. 650 So.2d 923. 925 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (reversing
denial of waiver where the minor was -sufficiently mature and informed" to make a
decision regarding abortion without parental consent): In re Anonymous. 650 So.2d
919, 921 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (affirming denial of waiver where the applicant failed
to seek advice from a medical professional or a counselor concerning an abortion
and other alternatives); In re Anonymous, 597 So.2d 709. 710 (Ala. Clv. App. 1992)
(affirming the juvenile court's denial of waiver where the applicant failed to seek
medical advice or consult with any adult).
'64 See Wilkinson, 639 F. Supp. at 956-58 (denying the motion of a seventeen-year-
old girl, who never obtained or used contraception, to enjoin the application of a
Utah statute requiring a physician to notify parents of an immature minor seeking
an abortion); In re Jane Doe 1, 566 N.E.2d 1181. 1184 (Ohio 1990) (affirming denial
of waiver where, among other things. the 17-year-old petitioner had already had one
abortion the previous year and had discontinued use of birth control measures).
165 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60. 74 n.30 (1983) (citing social
science literature on sexual activity among teenagers).
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American Civil Liberties Union," for example, Justice Breyer
pressed the Deputy Solicitor General of the United States to
acknowledge what most adults take for granted: adolescents
are very interested in sex and in their own sexuality. Justice
Breyer was concerned that the portions of the Communica-
tions Decency Act at issue, which the Supreme Court over-
turned in its ruling, would make typical conversations among
teenagers illegal if conducted on the Internet. "Suppose,"
Justice Breyer asked:
a group of high school students decide to communicate across
the internet and they want to tell each other about their sexual
experiences, whether those are real or imagined .... That's
been known to happen in high school (Laughter) .... If you get
seven high school students on a telephone call, I bet that...
happens from time to time.167
Conversation and curiosity do not necessarily lead to ac-
tion. Rachel, the Hasidic romance reader described in Part I
supra, was especially intrigued by the portrayal of heterosex-
ual love and sexuality in her purloined novels." Neither the
knowledge gleaned from these books, nor the fantasies and
dreams they stimulated, gave Rachel the courage to object
when her parents arranged a marriage for her.16
For most teenagers, sexuality provides a prime example of
what inspired Professor Franklin Zimring to call adolescence
a "learner's permit" for life. 7  Professor Zimring's metaphor is
apt; as young people mature, they need to develop the ability
to cope with increasing freedoms in a number of areas. At
first, safe experimentation requires close supervision by par-
ents and other responsible adults.17' Greater independence
follows gradually, as the individual teenager develops capaci-
166 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
167 Reno v. ACLU, 1997 U.S. TRANS. LEXIS 40, at *11-12 (Mar. 19, 1997). Deputy
Solicitor General Waxman replied wryly, "It may." Id.168 ABRAHAM, supra note 88, 246-47.
169 See generally id. The notion of romantic love did help to steel Rachel's resolve
when she later decided to leave her husband. See ti.. at 286. But it hardly led her
to abandon all traces of parental influence. When the novel ends. Rachel is a di-
vorced woman living in her parents' home. See id. at 294.
170 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE, 89-96
(1982).
171 I do not intend to suggest that the process of maturation is always, or even
usually, smooth whether with regard to sexuality or other areas of self-discovery.
Many young people abuse parental trust, and many parents provide inadequate su-
pervision. See Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259, 275 (1993) (Elber, J., dis-
senting) (discussing how some teenagers do not have actively involved parents who
are available to provide consent); id. (Miller, J., dissenting) (noting that "some stu-
dents who have interested parents are beyond their practical control in matters of
sexuality").
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ties and demonstrates responsibility.'"
The legal question that arises in relation to the right to re-
ceive information is whether the state can or should honor
the wishes of those parents who do not wish to give their
teenage child a "learner's permit" for sexuality and do not
want their teenager to have access to information about
"driving safely."173 The right of minors to information about
sexuality and contraception flows analytically from the pri-
vacy right to obtain an abortion without parental consent: "if
minors are permitted to obtain treatment for the conse-
quences of unprotected sexual intercourse without parental
consent or notification, it is inconsistent to restrict their ac-
cess to the means by which they can prevent an unwanted
pregnancy or protect themselves from sexually transmitted
diseases, including the deadly HIV virus." 74  Similarly, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reiterated
a district court's holding which stated that "[alccess to con-
traceptives may be just as important as access to abortions,"
which is protected for minors."m The withholding of health
information in the hope of preventing sexual activity fails to
meet a rationality standard, 76 much less the higher standard
of review required to regulate fundamental rights such as pri-
vacy. For the state to withhold information about safe sex in
the hopes of delaying sexual activity would be the equivalent
of banning motorcycle helmets and information about how to
172 Even commentators who downplay the importance of autonomy for children
recognize the legitimacy of Professor Zimring's metaphor. See Bruce C. Hafen &
Jonathan 0. Hafen, Abandoning Children to Their Autonomy: The United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 449. 456 (1996).
173 See STEPHEN L. CArER. THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF. How A.%IERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIAIZE REUGIOUS DEVOTION 200-03 (1993) (identifying sex education as
leading to -bitter battles" over values in the classroom). Professor Carter's writing
sensitizes the reader to the genuine concerns of religious believers who believe that
the abstinence message is a good and simple truth. Id. at 201-02. He gives short
shrift, however, to the corresponding legitimacy of the opposing concern that many
young people might die if the safe sex message is not communicated. Id. Because of
the long incubation period associated with AIDS, most of the young adults diagnosed
with AIDS probably contracted the virus as teenagers. U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, ADOLESCENTS AND HIV/AIDS: FACTS (Mar. 1998).
174 A!fonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 271 (Eiber. J.. dissenting). It Is important to note.
however, that this case involved distribution of condoms in public schools, rather
than of information.
175 Parents United for Better Schs.. Inc. v. School Dist. of Philadelphia Bd. of
Educ., 148 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Parents United III. In this por-
tion of its opinion, the Third Circuit cites Parents United for Better Schs.. Inc. v.
School Dist of Philadelphia Bd. of Educ.. 978 F. Supp. 197. 209 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
[hereinafter Parents United ].
176 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l. 431 U.S. 678. 715 (1977) (Stevens. J.. con-
curring) (arguing that "lain attempt to persuade by inflicting harm on the listener is
an unacceptable means of conveying a message that Is otherwise legitimate).
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wear them in order to emphasize society's disapproval of bik-
ers. 177
Federal courts have held that teenagers have privacy
rights in contraception even if they act without parental con-
sent. The Supreme Court held in Carey v. Population Services
International that minors have privacy rights concerning re-
productive choices, including contraception. 7 8 Lower federal
courts have expressly held that teenagers possess protected
privacy interests in contraception as a means of avoiding
pregnancy and of preventing disease. 79 The failure to use
condoms in the age of AIDS threatens young people with the
risk of life-threatening illness, as irreversible as the birth of a
child in the abortion cases. A federal district court in Boston
recently held that the importance to minors of receiving in-
formation about condoms and the prevention of AIDS out-
weighed any possible government interest in prohibiting pub-
lic service advertising about condom use on the mass transit
system."
The right of minors to receive information would increase
and protect the availability to minors of accurate information
7 See id.
18 See generally id. Although Carey was a plurality opinion, and is commonly re-
ferred to as such, the holding that teenagers have privacy rights regarding procrea-
tion commanded five votes. See id. at 681 (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J., joined by
Stewart, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.); id. at 693, 702 (White, J., concurring)
(agreeing with the plurality in the result and including "with respect to Part IV" in
which the plurality recognized the privacy interests of minors in contraception). Cf.
id at 703 (White, J., concurring ) and itL at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting
as frivolous the argument that minors have a privacy right in contraception over the
objections of parents and the state).
79 See Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1980) (stating that the minor's
right of privacy includes the right to obtain contraceptives and sex counseling with-
out parental consent); Parents United I, supra note 175, at 209-10 (holding that mi-
nors have a constitutional right to privacy encompassing the use of contraceptives),
affd on other grounds, 148 F.3d at 269-70 (Scirica, J.) (upholding a consensual con-
dom distribution program with a parental opt-out provision, and noting the District
Court's observation that during the past two decades the Supreme Court has con-
sistently rejected blanket parental consent requirements for abortions) (citing
Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001, 1009 (D. Utah
1983)); see also, Doe, 615 F.2d at 1168; Curtis v. School Community of Falmouth.
652 N.E.2d 580 (Mass. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1067 (1996); T.H. v. Jones, 425
F. Supp. 873, 881 (D. Utah 1975) affd on statutory grounds, 425 U.S. 986 (1976).
180 AIDS Action Comm. of Mass. Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 849 F.
Supp. 79, 84 (D. Mass. 1993), affd on other grounds, 42 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994). My
article, Anything Goes, supra note 43, discusses AIDS Action and related cases In
greater detail with emphasis on the state's alleged interests in regulating speech.
That article balances the competing claims of the state and parents differently than
in the argument here; there, I emphasize the state's failure to establish a compelling
interest in regulating protected speech as compared to the interest of parents who
wish their children to have access to such speech. The theses of the two articles are
not inconsistent. Both arguments would result in a more vibrant marketplace of
ideas being available to young people as well as to adults.
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about contraception. My argument is limited to questions
about the right to knowledge; it should not be construed as
supporting behavioral license. For purposes of my argument,
it does not matter how young people use the information they
obtain: they may be trying to decide whether to engage in
sexual relations at all, or choosing the most reliable, safest
form of birth control because they have already decided to
become sexually active, or may primarily be interested in pre-
venting sexually transmitted diseases. The precedents appli-
cable to adults dictate that access to information cannot be
denied based on speculation and fear that the information
might be used in the service of a legal activity, the morality of
which is subject to debate.'8'
The right of minors to receive information about contra-
ception and sexuality, regardless of their parents' views,
would arise most frequently in one of three institutional set-
tings: health clinics that receive public fhnds, libraries and
public schools. In each instance, the hybrid claim created by
the right to receive information, combined with the minor's
recognized privacy interest in contraception, would prevent
the state from imposing barriers on young people seeking in-
formation without parental consent.
Consider the clinic that receives public funds and provides
both information and contraceptives.'2 The constitutional
right to receive information should ensure access to coun-
seling in such clinics, even without parental notification and
consent"'t Clinics frequently offer educational materials and
counseling in addition to concrete medical services, including
prescriptions and contraceptive devices. Indeed, clinics may
require minors to receive education, including advice on
risks, before they receive medical treatmenL' Public clinics
may even encourage parental consent, consultation and par-
ticipation, but may not legall require it without violating an
adolescent's privacy rights.' Where the state does not re-
181 See supra Part I.A
182 Title X of the Public Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1994). which authorizes
comprehensive family planning services, requires confidentiality regarding those
services, including services rendered to adolescents. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n
of America, Inc. v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650. 659-60 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (discussing Con-
gress' intent that family planning services be confidential).
183 My argument here suggests that the right of minors to obtain such information
is not dependent on the continuation of current statutory protections. The right to
receive information means that family planning materials cannot be constitutionally
withheld from minors if the same material is made available to adults.
l8 See Doe, 615 F.2d at 1163 (noting that minors must attend an educational rap
session" at the state-funded clinic before receiving medical services related to contra-
ception).
Id. at 1163-64, 1166 (noting that minors are encouraged to bring parents with
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quire minors to visit such clinics, however, it arguably does
not even impinge on parental rights, whether they are
couched in the language of the fundamental right of parent-
ing, or as a free exercise claim.'8 To this extent, the public
health clinic is easily distinguished from the more compli-
cated case of the public school, which operates under a re-
gime of compulsory education.
In a public library, as in a public clinic, the child of par-
ents whose religious beliefs bar the use of birth control under
any circumstances, as well as sex outside of marriage, could
rely on the right to receive information to support his efforts
to learn about sexuality. Parental consent may be required,
however, to see the pertinent books and magazines.' The
filters installed on many library computers prevent access to
all sites containing the term "sex," including pages devoted to
contraception and prevention of sexually transmitted dis-
eases. 8  Such restrictions unconstitutionally interfere with
the minor's right to information in the service of a constitu-
tionally protected privacy right.
If the right of mature minors to receive information under
the circumstances proposed here gains recognition, current
presumptions would be reversed. Instead of requiring young
people to obtain consent before they can consult controversial
materials, books would be available to minors over a certain
age, unless their parents specifically instructed the institu-
tions to deny those minors access to certain information.
This approach flows from the observation in the context of
abortions that it is hard to distinguish parental notice from
parental consent requirements. Parents who wish to block
them to the rap sessions, and to talk with their parents about "their sexual inter-
ests," but are not compelled to do so); see also Parents United I, supra note 175, at
209 (citing County of St. Charles v. Missouri Family Health Council, 107 F.3d 682,
684-85 (8th Cir. 1997)) (reviewing cases and concluding that all circuit courts which
have reached the question have ruled that parental consent cannot be required un-
der Title X).
,86 See Doe, 615 F.2d at 1168 (noting that this is not a situation where the state Is
requiring or prohibiting some activity); see also Curtis v. School Community of Fal-
mouth, 652 N.E.2d 580, 586 (Mass. 1995) (asserting that a coercive or compulsory
effect on claimant's rights is necessary to support allegations of a violation of paren-
tal liberty).
187 See, e.g., HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, BANNED IN THE U.S.A. A REFERENCE GUIDE TO
BOOK CENSORSHIP IN SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC LIBRARIES 167 (1994) (describing placement
of a public library book on homosexuality behind the circulation desk, usable only
on request); PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, ATrACKS ON THE FREEDOM TO LEARN 101.
102 (1996) (citing incidents where challenges to library books led to imposition of
parental consent requirements).
18 See Ann Beeson & Chris Hansen, Fahrenheit 451.2: Is Cyberspace Burning?
(visited Sept. 4, 1999) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/burning.htm> (describing
both intentional and unintentional consequences of computer filtering systems).
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the flow of available information to their children should bear
the burden of imposing the restrictions, just as when they
desire to opt their children out of a school's sex education or
biology curriculum.18 If a mature minor whose parents have
erected a barrier to the receipt of information from a public
institution needs that information to pursue a hybrid right,
such as contraception, libraries could easily designate an ex-
perienced staff member to assess such claims. The assess-
ment would involve evaluating the maturity of the petitioner's
presentation, the importance of the independent liberty inter-
est, and the immediacy of the mature minor's need to obtain
the material. I do not envision an overwhelming number of
bypass petitions coming before librarians, let alone before the
courts. As with the use of judicial bypass procedures in the
abortion context, it seems likely that through such an as-
sessment, young people with enough seriousness of purpose
to discuss such matters with an adult stranger would obtain
the information they seek. But to be meaningful, rights must
be enforceable. A mature minor, therefore, must be permit-
ted to seek judicial review after exhausting administrative
channels, but only when the underlying claim involves the
exercise of an independent autonomy right. The defendant in
such actions would be the government entity that honored
the parents' opt-out request, not the petitioner's parents.
The question of whether parents may prevent their teenage
children from receiving information in school about sex,
sexually transmitted diseases, and prevention is an even
closer question. 19 The spread of sexually transmitted dis-
eases, including AIDS, has led many public schools to sup-
plement comprehensive sex education courses with condom
distribution programs.1 9' Only three reported cases consider
'9 "Mhe state is required to plan its curriculum on the basis of educational con-
siderations .... " Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ.. 51
Cal. App. 3rd 1, 18 (1975). -[S]tudent[s] [however.] may be excused from any part
that conflicts with the parents' religious beliefs." Id. at 19.
190 See Alfonso v. Fernandez. 606 N.Y.S.2d 259. 266 (1993) (noting that the suit
did not challenge the educational component of the program. even though students
would be exempted from instruction if their parents agreed to instruct them at home.
informed by materials made available by the school): see generally Curts. 652
N.E.2d at 586 (holding that there is no burden on parents where It is entirely up to
the student to choose whether to read literature or seek counseling which the school
makes available); Parents United 1. supra note 175. reu'd. 148 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 1998)
(not reaching the question of a minor's right to challenge a parental decision to bar
participation in school sex education classes. counseling, and condom distribution
programs).
Catherine Veiss & Sherrill Cohen. Condom Avallabllity Programs In the PublIc
Schools: Approved in the Courts, 26 HtJM. RTS. 19 (1999) (noting that "[sichools that
have adopted condom availability programs did so primarily in response to the
alarming rates of HIV infection among teenagersr). Weiss and Cohen served as lead
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constitutional challenges brought by parents against condom
distribution programs in public schools." Authorities are di-
vided on whether schools may distribute condoms directly to
students.'93 The sole court to overturn a condom distribution
program expressly distinguished provision of condoms from
provision of information:
This is not a case in which parents are complaining solely about
having their children exposed to ideas or a point of view with
which they disagree or [which they] find offensive ....
[Sitanding alone, such opposition would falter in the face of the
public school's role in preparing students for participation in a
world replete with complex and controversial issues. However,
the condom availability component of the [school's] distribution
program creates an entirely different situation. Students are not
just exposed to talk or literature on the subject of sexual behav-
ior. ... "
The court understood that it is critical to distinguish between
behavior, in this instance defined by possession of contra-
ceptive devices and a presumption of imminent sexual activ-
ity, and receipt of ideas.
The right to receive information would mean that a six-
teen-year-old could demand information even if his parents
withheld consent for him to participate in the condom pro-
gram at his school.'95 If the program includes both informa-
tion about, and distribution of, condoms, as does the pro-
gram in the Philadelphia schools, the student should have a
right to receive information from the schools, related to fun-
damental privacy interests even if, given his parents' objec-
tions, he does not have a constitutional right to receive the
actual condoms from the school. He can obtain condoms
elsewhere.'96
counsel in Parents United L
192 See Parents United II, supra note 175 (upholding the program): Curtis, 652
N.E.2d 580 (upholding a condom distribution program): but see Alfonso. 606
N.Y.S.2d at 267 (overturning the condom distribution program because it lacked a
parental opt-out provision, but not considering the informational portion of the
school district's efforts to combat sexually transmitted diseases).
193 The critical distinction among the cases, however, Is the court's view of the
presence or absence of a parental consent or opt-out provision. See Aifonso, 606
N.Y.S.2d at 267 (holding that the absence of an opt-out or consent provision invali-
dates condom distribution program): see also Parents United 1, 148 F.3d at 264. 275
(noting that the condom distribution program survives parental challenge because It
includes a parental opt-out provision); Curtis, 652 N.E.2d at 583, 585-86 (disagree-
ing with the majority in Afonso and holding that no parental consent or opt-out pro-
vision is required, because the program Is not compulsory).
194 Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 266 (internal citations omitted).
195 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (holding that the family Is
not beyond regulation in the public interest even in the face of a religious exercise
claim).
1 Minors may legally purchase condoms that are widely available at pharmacies
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C. Developing Religious Autonomy and Religious Beliefs
The Supreme Court has recognized the legitimacy of the
religious beliefs minors share with their parents.'9 By a null
hypothesis, the Supreme Court has accepted the notion that
even elementary school children can develop deeply held re-
ligious beliefs that command respect under the Constitution.
Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution
and "possess constitutional rights."'9 But maturing minors
might begin to question their parents' beliefs, and may even
develop their own strongly held religious beliefs. Indeed, the
search for religious meaning is a quintessential aspect of
adolescence."
The Supreme Court has never directly confronted the
problem raised by Justice Douglas' dissent in Yoder should
the state accommodate the religious preferences of parents
whose children do not share their religious beliefs?' Reso-
lution of such a conflict would require delicate balancing
within a specific context. Identifying the correct resolution in
any particular case is beyond the scope of the current in-
quiry. The inquiry here is limited to an analysis of the ma-
ture minor's right to receive speech that will inform under-
standing and belief systems. The ability to gather
information is a prerequisite to any assertion of a young per-
son's independent claims and preferences."'
Consider -a seventeen year-old member of the Church of
Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints preparing for a service
and convenience stores, displayed near mundane items such as vitamins and cold
remedies." See Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
197 See Prince. 321 U.S. at 171 (Murphy. J.. dissenting) (recognizing the 'genuine
religious" beliefs of a nine-year-old), West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette. 319 U.S.
624, 629-31 (1943) (Jackson, J.) (emphasizing that the religious exercise rights being
asserted belong to the children as well as the parents, and reflect the children's own
beliefs); &t. at 646 (Murphy, J.. concurring) (asserting that the state may not force a
child to make statements "wrung from him contrary to his religious beliefsl): see also
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-43 (1972) (Douglas. J.. dissenting In part)
(noting that even for a youth, religion is a matter of individual conscience).
198 See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 52. 74 (1976) (citing
precedential support for the proposition that minors as well as adults possess rights
under the Constitution).
199 See Sara Rimer, Columbine Students Seek Answers In Their Faith. N.Y. TBIES.
June 6. 1999, at A26 (noting that according to experts. "adolescence Is a prime time
for seeking spiritual meaning along with personal identity).
See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 245 (asserting that lilt is the future of the student, not
the future of the parents, that is imperiled"): td. at 244 (arguing that "[the children
[are] entitled to be heard").
21 The question of how courts should balance the competing rights of mature mi-
nors possessed of information to support their choices against the rights of parents.
and the State's interests, if any, is beyond the scope of this article.
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as a missionary.2° He may want to decide before leaving the
country if he truly is devout. This young man needs to figure
out where he stands before he finds himself at age eighteen in
a remote country proselytizing for his faith. The constitu-
tional right to receive information protects such a youth's
right to use public libraries to learn about other religions or
read criticisms of his own faith.
The opening hypothetical in this article described a sixteen
year-old girl who knows that she is dying of leukemia; let us
call her Amy. Amy wants to discover her personal religious
beliefs so that she can make peace with her god, who might
not turn out to be the god in whom her parents believe. Her
situation clearly satisfies the limiting criteria for a minor to
assert the right to know as described above. Amy is protected
by the Free Exercise Clause in her search to make a signifi-
cant choice, albeit a choice that may lack concreteness in this
world. According to some widely accepted belief systems,
such as those that emphasize consensual baptism or relig-
ious rituals at a deathbed, her choice may not be effective if
postponed until after her death.20 3 Finally, the imminence of
death makes her religious affirmations irrevocable. Assume
that Amy's father is an authoritarian religious leader. If Amy
is ambulatory, she should be able to learn about other relig-
ions by going to the library. If she is confined to a public
hospital that offers library services, the hospital should pro-
vide her with the material she requests, even over the objec-
tions of her parents.
Amy's dilemma becomes even more pressing if her emerg-
ing religious beliefs conflict with her parents' convictions re-
garding the choice of medical treatment . °  Suppose that
Amy's parents refuse to consent to blood transfusions or to
any type of medical intervention. If the hospital seeks a court
202 Elizabeth Harmer-Dionne, Note, Once a Peculiar People: Cognitive Dissonance
and the Suppression of Mormon Polygamy As a Case Study Negating the Belief-Action
Distinction, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1295, 1338 (1998) (describing how the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints "embarked on a worldwide quest for converts" after the
law suppressed the uniqueness of plural marriage).
203 See PAUL HESSET, INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIANITY 207-209 (1958); MARY JO
WEAVER, INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIANITY 225 (1991).
204 See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 328 (I1. 1989) (finding that a minor adjudicated
mature may exercise her common law right to refuse medical treatment); see gener-
ally Lee E. Teitelbaum, Youth Crime and the Choice Between Rules and Standards,
1991 BYU L. REV. 351, 369-70 (1991) (noting that even young children reason in a
similar fashion as adults, and should therefore be treated as capable of rational
choice). For a thoughtful discussion of medical conflict between parents and minors
with an emphasis on the competency of minors to participate in decisions about
medical care, see Susan D. Hawkins, Note, Protecting the Rights and Interests of
Competent Minors in Litigated Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075,
2095-132 (1996).
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order allowing it to treat Amy, the court may seek her in-formed opinion about her own beliefs.20 5 Since Amy's life is atimminent risk, a court may well override her religious convic-tions and order treatment.2' Amy, however, may not be ableto testify as to her informed opinion without access to otherinformation systems. The problem is equally complex if wesuppose that Amy's parents have no doctrinal objection tomedical care, but as Amy pursues her research, she herselfadopts a doctrine that bars such treatment The ultimatecourse of action will depend on contextual factors, includingthe likelihood that treatment could actually prolong her life.
D. Independent-Minded Amish Teenagers
The difficult but undeveloped case of ensuring the protec-tion of the Amish child who wants to pursue a secular edu-cation, which worried Justice Douglas in his dissent in Yo-derY provides rich hypotheticals that starkly present theneed teenagers may have to assert a right to receive informa-tion. Assume that the silent Amish teenagers in Yoder do, infact, appear before the court. Barbara Miller testifies that shehas doubts about what choice is right, and needs more in-formation before making such an important decision as end-ing her secular education. Vernon Yutzy asserts that heplans to pursue a medical degree, against his parents'wishes. Either fact pattern presents an equally compellingneed for access to ideas through the right to receive informa-
tion.
Barbara tells the court that she has no idea what shewants to do in the future. She has had very limited exposureto the world, so she cannot compare her Amish community tothe possible alternatives. Barbara is willing to consider leav-ing school and committing to a life as a religious member ofthe community, as her parents desire. First, however, shewould like to read books about the secular world. She is noteven asking to see the world, but just wants to read aboutwhat life would be like for a nuclear physicist, a ballerina, oreven a belly dancer.2 The school and the public library,
WS ee In re Green, 292 A.2d 387, 392 (Pa. 1972) (remanding for inquiry Into theteenage patient's views regarding his mother's religious objection to blood transfu-sions).
See id. at 391.
207 See Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205. 244 (1972) (noting that 'children shouldbe entitled to be heard" on the important matter of education); &L at 237 (Stewart. J..concurring) (arguing that the record does not present "the interesting and Importantissue" raised by Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion).208 See &L at 240 (White, J., concurring) (noting that some Amish youth "may wish
Dec. 1999]
268 JOu_ iuu, UP U
however, have acceded to her parents' request that she 
not be
allowed access to the books that would answer 
her ques-
tions.2 09 Barbara's right to receive information in the 
service
of her independent, free exercise claim supports her 
effort to
gain access to books that the school and library regularly
make available to other teenagers.
Vernon Yutzy's hypothetical testimony suggests an 
issue
that is starkly presented by a slight adjustment to the 
facts in
Pierce, where the Supreme Court held that parents 
have a
liberty interest in controlling the choice of their children's
school, including private or parochial schools.
210 Imagine that
instead of removing Vernon from school altogether 
after
eighth grade, his parents enroll him in an Amish 
school,
which is accredited, thereby satisfying the compulsory 
edu-
cation laws. Under Pierce, Vernon's parents have 
a constitu-
tionally recognized liberty interest in the option of 
substitut-
ing a religious education for a secular one."
' Assume,
however, that the parochial school that Vernon attends 
offers
a curriculum carefully structured to shield him 
from "mod-
ern" ideas, and that the content of the school's library 
is se-
lected to reinforce the denominational values in the 
curricu-
lum. 212 Under current law, that parochial school 
is entitled to
maintain a closed system of communications that 
promotes
the values of the Amish religion, and no state action Is 
impli-
cated.2 3
What if 14-year old Vernon cannot use the public 
library
after school, because the librarian accedes to his parents' 
re-
quest that he be denied library privileges?
24 At what point, if
any, would Vernon have the right to use the public 
library,
to become nuclear physicists, ballet dancers, computer 
programmers, or historians,
and for these occupations, formal training will be necessary"): 
kL at 244 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out that a child may want to become 
"a pianist or an astronaut
or an oceanographer").
209 See Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 398 (D. N.H. 
1974) (holding that the rights
of children are distinguishable from those of their 
parents under the First Amend-
ment).
210 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 520 (1925) (holding that parents
have a liberty interest in choosing whether to send 
their children to public or paro-
chial schools).
211 Id
212 See, e.g., JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 24 (1998)
(arguing that many sectarian schools systematically 
limit access to materials that
mit be inconsistent with the school's religious 
doctrine).
3 See id. at 45-54 (discussing the scope of permissible state action in directing
children's education).
214 There is no reason to regard public libraries as an antiquated relic in the age of
electronic communication. Vartan Gregorian, president 
of the Carnegie Corporation,
recently stated, "[nmo search engine can replace the 
library or the librarian ... Itihe
library... is the 'people's palace.' It contains the DNA 
of our culture." Public Lives:
Help for Libraries, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1999, at B2.
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even if his parents will not countersign his application for a
library card?215 The right to receive information that will pre-
serve Vernon's options in life rather than make him a "mar-
tyr" to his parents' religious beliefs, should mean that if
Vernon can get himself to the library, he should be able to
read science books, including books about evolution, the re-
productive system and space travel.1 ' Once again, an experi-
enced librarian may be designated to assess such requests
from mature minors.
Vemon's challenge to his parents' right to remove him
from the public school system would present a more delicate
dilemma. He might argue that he has a right to attend the
public school to which his parents would be entitled to send
him.217  If enrolled in that public school, Vernon would de-
mand the right to pursue the standard science curriculum
including biology and evolution, despite the objections voiced
by his parents. Both steps- enrollment in the school and
enrollment in the course over his parents' objections- would
raise difficult questions of first impression.
There is ample support for Vernon to succeed in both ef-
forts based on these facts. First, Vernon has a right to re-
ceive ideas in his developmental search to be the "master[] of
[his] own destiny."21 8  Second, the religious exemption
Vemon's parents seek to enforce concerns their own religious
exercise claims, which he has publicly renounced. Third, the
state has "a high responsibility for education of its citizens [ I
to impose reasonable regulations for the control.., of basic
education."219
Respecting parental control over their children's education
does not mean that the state is powerless to protect children
from parents who elect not to provide an education that pre-
215 A policy under review in Fairfax County. Virginia would allow parents to notify
the library that they wish to deny their child under age 13 all access to the Interet.
Children over the age of 13 would have unlimited Internet access. See Victoria Ben-
ning, Should Children Be Kept Offline? Fearing Porn. Fairfax Libraries May Umit Ac-
cess to Internet, THE WASHINGTON POST, OcL 15. 1997. at BI.
216 See Prince v. Massachusetts. 321 U.S. 158. 166 (1944) (stating that the state
may limit parents' religious and parental rights by, among other requirements. re-
quiring school attendance so that parents may not make -martyrs" of their children).
217 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ.. 119 S. CL 1661. 1681 (1999) (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) (stating that, "[p]ublic schools are generally obligated by law to
educate all students who live within defined geographic boundaries').
218 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205. 245 (1972) (Douglas, J.. dissenting in part)
(stating that "lilt is the student's Judgment. not his parents!, that is essential if we
are to give full meaning to what we have said about the Bill of Rights and of the right
of students to be masters of their own destiny.).
219 Id. at 213; see also Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923) (Holmes. J.. dis-
senting) (arguing that the state may have an interest in ensuring that all children
receive the same education with regard to language).
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pares them for secular life. Education, the Supreme Court
has emphasized, "has a fundamental role in maintaining the
fabric of our society."220 In terms of the societal interests in-
volved, which include citizenship, self-sufficiency, and the
opportunity for social mobility,221 it should not make any dif-
ference whether the obstacle to receiving information is ra-
cism, 222 discrimination against the children of undocumented
immigrants,2  poverty," or the decisions of the parents
themselves. The constitution of almost every state guaran-
tees the state's children a public education through secon-
dary school.25 States retain the right to license and supervise
non-public schools, and to deny accreditation to such schools
if they fall beneath an acceptable threshold. 26  Even where
parents decide to educate their children at home, the state
retains the ability to enforce minimal educational stan-
dards.227 Since courts around the country agree that the
state may act to ensure that children being home schooled
receive an adequate education, it follows logically that the
state can overrule requests to compromise education for indi-
220 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
221 See id. at 222 (holding that although education is not a "right" guaranteed by
the Constitution, the benefits derived therefrom place it in a position of supreme im-
portance in our society).
222 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding that segregat-
ing children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprives minority children of
equal educational opportunities).
See Plyler, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down a Texas statute that authorized
local school districts to deny enrollment to children of illegal Immigrants).
224 See McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 415 Mass. 545, 551
(1993) (concluding that the Commonwealth had a constitutional duty to ensure the
education of each child in the Massachusetts public school system); Abbott by Ab-
bott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 454 (N.J. 1998) (mandating the Implementation of re-
medial measures by the state to ensure that public school students from poor neigh-
borhoods receive constitutionally-guaranteed educational entitlements).
25 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1681 (1999) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (citing constitutional provisions of various states guaranteeing stu-
dents a free primary and secondary public school education). To be sure, these con-
stitutional guarantees do not necessarily mean that the state itself provides an ade-
quate education. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP ON
THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES, AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK:
A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL ACTION 26-27 (1993).
226 See generally Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1042 n.4 (8th Cir. 1988)
(noting that the state's power to enforce standards for non-public schools Is "a sen-
sible corollary" of the parental right to use such schools to satisfy compulsory edu-
cation laws upheld in Pierce).
227 See id.. at 1044 (agreeing with the Court's precedent in stating that although
parents have a right to decide how to educate their children, this right Is not abso-
lute and may be interfered with by the state).
28 See Lisa M. Lukasik, The Latest Home Education Challenge: The Relationship
Between Home Schools and Public Schools, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1913, 1946-47 (1996)
(discussing several cases as well as state constitutions and statutes which support
the contention that home education is not "free from all state regulation or control").
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vidual children enrolled in the public schools.2
Vemon's hypothetical situation results from the refusal of
his parents to acknowledge that he does not share their re-
ligious convictions, and from their efforts to deny him a stan-
dardized education. Where parental discretion to supervise
education severely limits a minor's opportunity and interferes
with the exercise of fundamental autonomy rights, public in-
stitutions such as schools can provide balance for parental
restrictions.' The obligation of public institutions to pre-
serve the minor's right to receive information would flow from
the combination of the teenager's right to knowledge and the
state's interest "that children be both safeguarded from
abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and inde-
pendent" citizens. r
E. Gendered Limitations on Access to Information
The doctrine developed in this article stretches beyond the
quest for information in the service of the fundamental con-
stitutional rights analyzed above. Gendered differentiation in
providing access to information would be very hard for the
state to justify- even if undertaken in response to parental
requests. Although the Supreme Court has never found sex
to constitute a suspect class under the Equal Protection
Clause,2 in modem times it has uniformly subjected gender
differentiation to heightened scrutiny.2 It seems clear that
= See Altman v. Bedford CenL Sch. DISL. 45 F. Supp.2d 368. 383. 385-86. 396
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that public school parents do not have the right to remove
their children from required classes covering such topics as Indian culture and the
Hindee religion, the life of Buddha, or Quezacoatl. and that there Is no constitutional
basis for a blanket "parental opt-out" privilege).
2W See Lupu, supra note 79, at 1320; Woodhouse. supra note 127. at 412 (arguing
for a shared responsibility for all children in which parents and public institutions
such as schools would play collaborative roles).
231 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158. 165 (1944) (holding that the family is
not beyond regulation in the public interest even in the face of a free exercise claim).
= See United States v. Virginia. 518 U.S. 515. 532-33 (1996) (Ginsburg. J.)
(holding that sex is not a proscribed classification like race or national origin. and
thus is not subject to strict judicial scrutiny).
Id. at 531 (holding that official classification based on gender places a heavy
burden on the state to demonstrate a real. -exceedingly persuasive Justificationi: see
also i&. at 558 (Rehnquist, C.J.. concurring) (quoting Craig v. Boren. 429 U.S. 190.
197 (1976), where the Court announced that -Itlo withstand constitutional chal-
lenge ... classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectivesi]: Virginia. 518
U.S. at 532 (noting that, beginning with its decision in Reed v. Reed. 404 U.S. 71
(1971), the Supreme Court has recognized that the government must act compatibly
with the Equal Protection principle as applied to women): Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
Gender and the Constitution. 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1. 17-23 (1975) (tracing the applica-
tion of heightened scrutiny for gender since 1971).
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schools may not initiate gender based curricular distinctions
consistent with the principle of equal protection.
The question arises here, however, whether a public
school may accommodate a parental request that their male
and female children receive different educational programs.
The issue is important, since a significant number of parents
who remove their children from public schools for religious
reasons take issue with what they perceive to be the "unisex
movement where you can't tell the difference between boys
and girls" in the public schools.'
Suppose that the father of a girl enrolled in public school
believed that girls should not take math or science courses
because to do so would be "against nature." Suppose further
that he would not let his daughters participate in such
classes. Assume as well that it is legally irrelevant whether
the parents' decision rests in religious or secular beliefs, be-
cause the school district recognizes a parent's right to seek
exemption from any course requirement for any reason. The
girl in question, on the other hand, avidly desires the same
education offered to her peers of both sexes.' She demands
that the school enroll her in math and science. The school,
and the courts, might reject an equal protection claim, on the
grounds that the primary actor under this formulation ap-
pears to be the parent.26 The emerging constitutional right to
receive information for mature minors might well provide a
remedy for that girl. The right to receive information would
help young people to gain the "equal opportunity to aspire,
achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on
their individual talents and capacities."237 That girl, success-
ful in her demand for an equal educational opportunity, could
grow up to be a rocket scientist.
234 Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96, 97 (4th Cir. 1983) (quoting part of a fa-
ther's explanation of his reasons for home schooling, rejected by the court); see also
DWYER, supra note 212 at 26-27, 39-40.
25 I reserve the question of whether accommodating parental distinctions based on
gender would be an appropriate exercise of state power if the girl shared the views of
herparents or, at least, did not object.
2V If the school district itself differentiated in schedule or assignments based on
gender, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 would presumably provide a
cause of action. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (stating that no person shall "be subjected
to discrimination under any education program" receiving federal funds "on the basis
of sex"). I am not aware of any reported case brought under Title IX involving as-
signments or differentiated curricula within a coeducational school, probably be-
cause such a fact situation would blatantly violate the statute.
27 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532. Gender bias is not necessarily limited to girls, al-
though it is most frequently manifested in that direction. A parallel situation would
be presented if the parents of a boy asked that he not be allowed to enroll in home
economics courses, and he wanted to become a chef.
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III. CONCLUSION
The commitment to pluralism inherent in the ideal of ro-
bust debate runs through the various clauses of the First
Amendment. Those values have long ignited profound con-
troversy. Some citizens often find it difficult to reconcile the
idea that the state promotes and protects pluralism, on the
one hand, with treasured notions of parental domination and
family privacy on the other. Analytically, however, those two
strands co-exist. Both find ample support in law and culture.
The differing emphasis of the two principles, however, some-
times results in complex conflicts in which the interests of
parents, minors and the state appear to be irreconcilable.
I recognize that for many readers the scenario of children
successfully challenging their parent's educational choices
resembles a cliff, rather than just a slippery slope, over which
the entire concept of parental supervision will plummeLt2
After all, what would become of the American family without
the ability of parents to threaten their children with such
statements as: "if you don't start behav-
ing/respecting/performing we'll ship you off to military
school!" My argument is not intended to challenge the prin-
ciple that responsible parents, who prepare their children for
life as adults, will continue to guide their child's education.2
The child will not normally be able to seek a legal remedy re-
garding the choice of school or curricular choices, nor would
a school normally respond to that child's protests. But the
very prospect of such interference with parental prerogatives
raises adult anxieties about diminishing parental control over
children and the intrusive potential of the state and its laws.
The maturing minor, however, has another set of concerns
equally recognized by the Constitution. The Constitution
grants minors a certain degree of autonomous rights, which
increase in relation to capacity. Within the notion of capac-
ity, the right to receive ideas is an essential prerequisite for
the exercise of rational choice. It is essential as well to the
development of autonomy and to informed decisions about
=s See Martha Minow. What Ever Happened to Children's Rights?. 80 Mitrm. L REV.
267 (1995) (noting that some critics view children's rights as incompatible with pa-
rental authority); see also Hafen & Hafen. supra note 168. at 472-73 (stating that the
notion that children have privacy rights may run counter to the concept of parental
control).
2M I am not arguing here that children have a legal right to force their parents to
take their views into account, to demand that their parents send them to a non-
public school, or to "receive an education that corresponds to [the child's) wi shes.
inclinations and talents" as provided in Finland's 1983 Child Custody and Rights of
Access Act. See Hafen & Hafen. supra note 168. at 463 n.71.
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whether or not minors share their parents' values. Both of
these notions are preconditions for a mature minor's mean-
ingful exercise of constitutional rights.
Ample precedent supports the right of mature minors to
receive information in the public domain over their parents'
objections. First, as demonstrated in Part I, the right to re-
ceive information has long been recognized for adults as a
necessary corollary to the freedom to speak. Courts have ap-
plied the right to receive information to children as well. Sec-
ond, children possess rights under the Speech Clause. Third,
mature minors possess constitutional rights that protect their
emerging autonomy claims, which create a need for informa-
tion. That individual need for knowledge on which to base
critical decisions is reinforced by the First Amendment's
commitment to protecting a marketplace of ideas.
The proposal that our jurisprudence expressly recognize a
right for mature minors to receive information will not result
in a "surrender [of] control" from adults to young people, such
as Justice Black feared when he dissented from Tinker.2 40
The right outlined here would not be available on a whim. A
minor could only invoke the right to receive information
where state action is implicated, where the minor can estab-
lish legal "maturity," and in order to enhance the meaningful
exercise of another right, such as the right to abortion, con-
traception or free exercise of religion.
In order to avoid moving family conflicts into public set-
tings, the right of a minor to receive information would be
subject to an additional set of limitations. The minor must
have a pressing need to receive the information before
achieving the age of majority, when parental objections will
no longer be entitled to any legal, as opposed to personal,
deference. A pressing need would be established where the
mature minor confronts a significant decision that implicates
constitutional liberties, where the decision cannot be post-
poned, and the consequences of the decision are irrevocable.
Once we articulate a normative constitutional right for
mature minors to receive information under such circum-
stances, the assumption that the state has discretion in rela-
tion to family conflicts about access to information shifts. If
minors have a constitutional right to receive information,
upon satisfaction of the limiting principles proposed here,
that right would create a strong new presumption that the
240 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Federal Constitution, in his view, does not compel
"teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control of the American
public school system to public school students").
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state should accommodate the minor's constitutional right to
knowledge. The resulting availability of information would
enhance the meaningful exercise of a variety of constitutional
rights which minors already possess.
